Equity vesting and investment by Edmans, A et al.
LBS Research Online
A Edmans, V Fang and K Lewellen
Equity vesting and investment
Article
This version is available in the LBS Research Online repository: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/
850/
Edmans, A, Fang, V and Lewellen, K
(2017)
Equity vesting and investment.
The Review of Financial Studies, 30 (7). pp. 2229-2271. ISSN 1572-3097
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx018
Oxford University Press
https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/doi/10.1093/r...
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Review of
Financial Studies following peer review. The version of record: Alex Edmans, Vivian W. Fang,
Katharina A. Lewellen; ’Equity vesting and investment’, Review of Financial Studies 2017; 30(7);
pp.2229-2271 is available online at:
https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhx018/3058111/Equity-Vesting-and-
Investment and at:
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx018
Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LBS Research Online for purposes of
research and/or private study. Further distribution of the material, or use for any commercial gain, is
not permitted.
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Review of 
Financial Studies following peer review.  
 
The version of record: Alex Edmans, Vivian W. Fang, Katharina A. Lewellen; Equity Vesting and 
Investment. Rev Financ Stud 2017 is available online at: 
https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhx018/3058111/Equity-Vesting-and-
Investment (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx018) 
 
1 
 
Equity Vesting and Investment 
 
Alex Edmans  
London Business School, CEPR, and ECGI 
 
Vivian W. Fang  
Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota 
 
Katharina A. Lewellen 
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
 
 
This paper links the CEO’s concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. 
We identify short-term concerns using the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given 
quarter. A one standard deviation increase in vesting equity is associated with an annualized 0.2% 
decline in growth in R&D plus net capital expenditure (scaled by total assets), 11% of the average 
investment-to-assets ratio. Vesting equity is also associated with positive analyst forecast revisions 
and positive earnings guidance during the same quarter. More broadly, by introducing a measure 
of incentives that is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely to be 
driven by current investment opportunities, our paper provides evidence that CEO contracts affect 
real decisions. (JEL G31, G34, M12, M52) 
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the link between real investment decisions and the CEO’s short-term stock 
price concerns. We introduce a new measure of short-term incentives: the amount of stock and 
options scheduled to vest in a given quarter.1 This measure is significantly correlated with CEO 
equity sales; it is also largely driven by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely to 
be related to current shocks to investment opportunities. We find that vesting equity is associated 
with reductions in the growth rates of research and development (“R&D”) and capital expenditure, 
positive analyst forecast revisions, and positive earnings guidance. These results suggest that vesting 
equity induces CEOs to reduce investment in long-term projects and increase short-term earnings, 
and more broadly that CEO contracts have a causal effect on real decisions.  
One of the most fundamental principles of corporate finance is that managers should maximize 
firm value by trading off short-term and long-term cash flows based on shareholders’ discount rates. 
This principle underlies almost all research on corporate investment and is a central premise in 
leading finance textbooks. However, the myopia models of Stein (1988, 1989) predict that stock 
price concerns will instead lead managers to overweight short-term cash flows and forgo value-
increasing long-term investments.  
Despite the importance of investment decisions in the research, teaching, and practice of 
corporate finance, there are very few tests of myopia, in part because short-term concerns are 
difficult to measure. Standard measures of CEO incentives (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990; Hall and 
Liebman 1998) quantify his overall level of equity holdings. However, short-term concerns arise not 
from overall equity, but from the amount of equity that the CEO expects to sell in the short-term. 
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking, options do not vest; they become exercisable. For brevity, we use the word “vest” to refer to options 
changing status from being unexercisable to exercisable. 
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Equity that the CEO plans to hold for the long-term may deter myopia (Edmans et al. 2012). Using 
actual equity sales to measure short-term incentives would be problematic since they are endogenous 
choices of the CEO and thus likely correlated with omitted variables that also drive investment. For 
example, negative private information on firm prospects may cause him to sell equity and also cut 
investment. In addition, actual equity sales include unexpected liquidity sales (which will not affect 
investment) and so are a mismeasured proxy for anticipated sales. 
We thus study neither total equity holdings nor actual equity sales, but the amount of equity that 
vests in a given quarter. As discussed earlier, vesting equity is largely driven by the schedule of 
equity grants made several years prior,2 and is highly correlated with actual short-term equity sales: 
a one standard deviation increase in vesting equity is associated with a rise in same-quarter equity 
sales by $140,000, 16% of the average level. The amount of vesting equity is also known to the CEO 
in advance, so he is able to change investment in anticipation. We construct this measure using the 
Equilar database, which tracks the vesting status of equity grants on an annual basis, based on the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) increased disclosure requirements from 2006. By 
devising an algorithm that allows the estimation of vesting dates, we are able to calculate vesting 
equity on a quarterly (rather than only annual) basis, thus enabling more precise identification. 
We find that vesting equity is associated with significant declines in the growth of five measures 
of investment, controlling for determinants of investment opportunities and the firm’s ability to fund 
investment, other components of CEO compensation (unvested equity, already-vested equity, salary, 
and bonus), CEO characteristics (age, tenure, and a new CEO indicator), as well as year, quarter, 
and firm fixed effects. A one standard deviation increase in vesting equity is associated with an 
annualized 0.2% decline in growth in R&D plus net capital expenditure (scaled by total assets), 11% 
                                                 
2 Gopalan et al. (2014) show that most equity grants do not fully vest for three to five years, and vesting schedules are 
largely predetermined at the time of grant. However, in some cases, vesting is based on accounting or stock performance, 
which may be correlated with current investment opportunities. We address this concern in Section 3.1.  
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of the average investment-to-assets ratio. The results continue to hold when removing grants with 
performance-based vesting provisions, considering only vesting stock or vesting options, using 
vesting equity as an instrument for equity sales in a two-stage least squares (“2SLS”) analysis, 
excluding controls, and using different algorithms to estimate vesting dates.  
One interpretation of our results is that stock price concerns lead CEOs to forgo positive-NPV 
investments at the expense of long-run value (the myopia hypothesis). An alternative explanation is 
that the vesting-induced investment cuts are efficient: if CEOs have a general tendency to overinvest, 
a focus on the short-term stock price could curb overinvestment (the efficiency hypothesis). This 
explanation still implies that CEO contracts affect real decisions, but unlike the myopia hypothesis, 
the effect is not inefficient. A third explanation is that boards schedule vesting dates to coincide with 
declines in investment opportunities (the timing hypothesis). Indeed, Gopalan et al. (2014) show that 
the duration of executive compensation is longer for firms with more R&D investments and higher 
market-to-book ratios (which indicates more valuable long-term projects). This explanation requires 
that boards forecast quarter-level declines in investment opportunities several years in advance. Note 
that it is still consistent with myopia theories, if boards believe that vesting equity exacerbates 
myopia and so try to ensure that equity does not vest while investment opportunities are strong.  
Distinguishing between these alternative hypotheses is challenging, in particular because we can 
only observe the level of investment and not its efficiency. Nevertheless, we perform indirect tests 
to evaluate them. To investigate the timing hypothesis, we rerun our tests including only grants 
issued at least two years prior, which are less likely to be correlated with current investment 
opportunities; the results remain robust. To investigate the efficiency hypothesis, we study changes 
in contemporaneous operating performance. If vesting equity induces the CEO to act more 
efficiently, we might expect him to do so by not only cutting unproductive investments but also 
improving other dimensions of operating performance. However, we find no change in the cost of 
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goods sold-to-sales ratio, operating expenses-to-sales ratio, or sales growth, suggesting that the 
investment cut is unlikely to be part of a general program to increase efficiency. Separately, we find 
that the link between vesting equity and investment growth is generally weaker in subsamples where 
the cost of myopia to the CEO is likely higher or its benefit lower, such as firms with more 
blockholders (who have incentives to analyze a firm’s fundamental value rather than current 
earnings), younger CEOs (who have greater career concerns and thus suffer more from long-run 
value erosion), and larger size and lower age (which indicate superior investment opportunities).  
Next, we study how the reduction in investment, induced by vesting equity, might benefit the 
CEO by increasing his payoff from equity sales. A CEO may communicate the increased earnings 
that result from the investment cut to the market before the earnings announcement through earnings 
guidance, public disclosures, press releases, or interviews. We first use analyst forecast revisions to 
assess the extent and effectiveness of the CEO’s overall communication. We find that vesting equity 
is positively and significantly related to the increase in analyst earnings forecasts within quarter q, 
the same time period in which the CEO sells equity. While forecast revisions measure the outcome 
of managerial communication, we also directly study one specific communication channel, earnings 
guidance. We find that vesting equity is associated with a higher likelihood that the firm issues 
positive earnings guidance during the same quarter, but not negative guidance. We also show that 
CEOs’ equity sales are concentrated in a small window immediately following positive guidance, 
likely because guidance occurs just before a trading window in which insiders are allowed to sell. 
This suggests that CEOs are able to benefit from guidance by selling shares immediately afterwards. 
Finally, we find that vesting equity is positively related to the likelihood that the announced earnings 
exceed the analyst consensus forecast by a narrow margin, but not by a wide margin. This result is 
consistent with the CEO communicating a level of positive earnings news that allows him to 
maximize his benefit from the investment cuts without creating a large risk of missing the forecast. 
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This paper is related to a large literature on managerial myopia. In addition to Stein (1988, 1989), 
other theories include Miller and Rock (1985), Narayanan (1985), Bebchuk and Stole (1993), Bizjak, 
Brickley, and Coles (1993), Goldman and Slezak (2006), Edmans (2009), and Benmelech, Kandel, 
and Veronesi (2010). Empirically, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) provide survey evidence 
that 78% of executives would sacrifice long-term value to meet earnings targets. Using standard 
measures of incentives that capture the CEO’s total equity holdings, Cheng and Warfield (2005), 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), and Peng and Roell (2008) find a positive association with 
earnings management, but Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) find no link to accounting fraud. 
These conflicting results may arise because, theoretically, it is the sensitivity to the short-term stock 
price that induces myopia. In addition, total equity holdings are potentially endogenous, because 
they depend on the amount of equity a CEO has chosen to hold onto.  
Our study is also related to papers that analyze the vesting horizon of the CEO’s equity. Kole 
(1997) is the first to describe vesting horizons, but does not relate them to firm behavior.3 Gopalan 
et al. (2014) are the first to undertake a systematic analysis of the horizon of a CEO’s incentives, 
also using Equilar. They introduce a new “duration” measure of CEO incentives and show how it 
varies across industries and with firm characteristics. They also link this measure to accruals4, but 
do not investigate real outcomes because duration – unlike vesting equity – depends on current 
equity grants and is thus likely correlated with current shocks to investment opportunities.  
                                                 
3 Some papers do not consider the horizon of equity incentives but do differentiate between unvested and vested equity. 
Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) show that vested stock is related to corporate fraud. Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi, 
Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) find that large holdings of vested options, particularly those in-the-money, are 
positively related to managers’ propensity to misreport.  
4 Unlike real activities such as changing investment, accruals management may not affect the firm’s fundamental value. 
Separately, Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) document a significant shift from accruals management to changes in 
investment and other discretionary expenses after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, suggesting that changes 
in investment are more relevant during our sample period. Graham et al. (2006) also find that “most earnings 
management is achieved via real actions as opposed to accounting manipulations” after Sarbanes-Oxley.  
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A contemporaneous paper by Ladika and Sautner (2016) shows that the adoption of FAS 123R 
induced some firms to accelerate option vesting, which in turn led to a fall in investment. Our papers 
are complementary in that they employ different empirical strategies to analyze the relation between 
vesting and investment, and find consistent results. While Ladika and Sautner (2016) focus on a 
one-time shock, we study a panel of firms with vesting events distributed over time. This broader 
setting allows us to quantify the responsiveness of investment to vesting equity, rather than study 
the more specific question of how investment responded to a change in accounting rules.  
Our paper also contributes to the broader literature on CEO compensation, beyond the specific 
topic of short-termism. Even though this literature is substantial, very few papers show that incentive 
contracts affect managers’ behavior, i.e., that CEO pay actually matters. The survey of Frydman and 
Jenter (2010) notes that “compensation arrangements are the endogenous outcome of a complex 
process … this makes it extremely difficult to interpret any observed correlation between executive 
pay and firm outcomes as evidence of a causal relationship.” This paper takes a step towards 
addressing the identification challenge, by introducing a measure of CEO incentives – vesting equity 
– that is unlikely to be driven by the current contracting environment. Thus, our results suggest that 
compensation has real effects. Indeed, our identification using vesting equity has since been used in 
wider contexts. Gopalan, Huang, and Maharjan (2015) use vesting equity as an instrument for 
duration and examine its effect on CEO turnover; Salitskiy (2015) links it to lower risk-taking; and 
Edmans et al. (2016) show that CEOs reallocate news towards months in which their equity vests 
and away from adjacent months. Turning to alternative identification strategies, Shue and Townsend 
(2016) use multi-year grant cycles as an instrument for option grants to identify the effects of 
compensation contracts on CEO risk taking; Flammer and Bansal (2016) conduct a regression 
discontinuity analysis of shareholder proposals to increase long-term compensation and find that 
such proposals improve long-run performance. 
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2 Data and Variable Measurement 
2.1 Measuring short-term concerns 
Our empirical approach is motivated by standard models of managerial myopia. In such models, 
the CEO’s wealth in quarter q is typically given by:  
௤ܹ ൌ ܵ௤ ൅ ߙ௤ሾ߱௤ ௤ܲ ൅ ∑ ߱௤ା௦ܧሺ ௤ܲା௦ሻሿ்ି௤௦ୀଵ ,    (1) 
where T is the number of periods, Wq is the manager’s wealth, Sq is cash salary, Pq is the stock price 
in quarter q, and q is the manager’s total number of shares, of which a fraction q is sold in quarter 
q. We have ∑ ߱௤ା௦்ି௤௦ୀ଴  = 1. The manager’s short-term incentives in quarter q – his incentives to 
increase Pq by a given percentage – are given by E(
ௗௐ೜
ௗ௉೜ ௤ܲ) = E(αqqPq i.e., the value of shares that 
he plans to sell in quarter q. Standard measures of incentives instead capture αqPq, i.e. total dollar 
equity holdings. Using αqqPq, the amount of equity actually sold in quarter q, to proxy for 
E(αqqPq) is also problematic due to the endogeneity concerns discussed earlier.  
We thus introduce a new measure of incentives to capture E(αqqPq the CEO’s concerns for 
the short-term stock price in particular: the effective dollar value of equity scheduled to vest in 
quarter q, converting options to share-equivalents using their deltas. Vesting equity leads to stock 
price concerns because risk-averse, undiversified executives should sell some equity upon vesting. 
While most CEOs hold vested equity, this may be due to various explicit or implicit constraints 
(documented by Armstrong, Core, and Guay (2015)). Vesting relaxes these constraints, allowing the 
CEO to reduce risk by selling equity.  
A first constraint results from ownership guidelines: requirements to hold equity in excess of a 
given multiple of salary or percentage of shares outstanding. These guidelines are typically satisfied 
only by vested equity (Core and Larcker 2002), and so vesting allows the CEO to sell equity without 
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violating the guidelines. Second, the CEO may hold vested equity voluntarily for control reasons – 
he wishes to maintain voting rights in excess of a particular threshold. Since unvested equity does 
not provide voting rights, vesting allows additional sales without falling below the threshold. Third, 
the CEO may hold a threshold level of vested equity to signal confidence in the firm. In addition to 
releasing constraints, vesting stock also imposes a tax charge on the CEO and so he may sell equity 
to pay the tax.5 Consistent with these points, we show in Section 3 that equity sales are strongly 
related to vesting equity, controlling for holdings of already-vested equity. Note that our 
identification does not require the CEO to sell his entire equity upon vesting, only that equity vesting 
is significantly correlated with equity sales. 
We calculate vesting equity using Equilar. The SEC’s compensation disclosure requirements, 
implemented in 2006, mandate companies to disclose grant-level (rather than merely aggregate-
level) information on each stock and option award held by a top executive in their proxy statements, 
including whether the award is vested or unvested. Equilar tracks this information for Russell 3000 
firms, versus ExecuComp which covers only S&P 1500 firms. We purchase this data for 2006-2010. 
Equilar’s variable “Shares Acquired on Vesting of Stock” directly gives the number of shares 
that vest in a given year, either from previously restricted stock or stock units, or long-term incentive 
plans. To calculate the number of vesting options, we use grant-by-grant information on a given 
CEO’s newly-awarded options in year t, and his unvested options at the end of years t-1 and t. We 
group these options by the strike price and expiry date. For a given price-date pair, we infer the 
number of vesting options using: 
 
VESTINGOPTNUMt = UNVESTEDOPTNUMt-1 + NEWOPTNUMt – UNVESTEDOPTNUMt,    (2) 
                                                 
5 Restricted stock represents income and so taxation is triggered upon vesting, unless a Section 83(b) election (to pay 
tax on the grant rather than vesting date) is made, which is uncommon.  
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where VESTINGOPTNUM is the number of vesting options, UNVESTEDOPTNUM is the number 
of unvested options, and NEWOPTNUM is the number of newly-awarded options.  
The above approach yields the number of securities that vest over a given year, because Equilar 
provides only annual data. To closely match the timing of vesting equity to the timing of investment, 
we calculate vesting equity at the quarterly level, since this is the highest frequency available for 
investment measures. To do so, we assign vesting equity in a year to a particular quarter based on 
the vesting date. For options, this is simple. Options vest and expire on the anniversary of a grant, 
and so we can use their expiry date to infer the vesting date.6 For stock, there is no expiry date, and 
grant dates are only available for shares awarded after 2006 in Equilar. We thus use the following 
algorithm. We first attribute vesting shares to post-2006 awards for which we know the grant dates 
from Equilar. Cliff-vesting grants vest at the end of the vesting period. For graded-vesting grants, 
we assume that they vest annually on a straight-line basis, following Gopalan et al. (2014). We then 
attribute the remaining vesting shares to pre-2006 grants. To approximate their grant dates, we use 
all grant dates of the post-2006 awards that we observe in Equilar. Specifically, if we observe n 
different grant dates in Equilar, we allocate the inferred vesting from pre-2006 grants evenly across 
the n dates.7 This step assumes that firms grant restricted stock in same quarter(s) of the year; indeed, 
out of the 1,758 sample firms that granted restricted stock more than once post 2006, 83% have 
repeated grants in the same month. Section 6 verifies robustness to other assumptions.  
                                                 
6 Gopalan et al. (2014) similarly assume that options vest on grant anniversaries, and we have checked this assumption 
by manually investigating a subsample of proxy filings that provide the full vesting schedule. 
7 If the vesting equity, calculated from post-2006 grants with known vesting schedules, exceeds “Shares Acquired on 
Vesting of Stock”, we decrease the amount of vesting equity from each grant proportionally. 6.8% of post-2006 grants 
have an unknown vesting schedule and vesting period in Equilar. We combine them with pre-2006 grants and apply our 
algorithm to the combination. Fewer than 1% of the grants vest only after CEO retirement; we exclude them.  
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Having identified the number of vesting securities, we calculate their delta: the number of shares 
a security is equivalent to, from an incentive standpoint. The delta of a share is 1; we calculate the 
delta of an option using the Black-Scholes formula.8 We then sum across the deltas of all of the 
CEO’s vesting stock and options. The aggregate delta measures the dollar change in vesting equity 
for a $1 change in the stock price, and reflects the effective number of vesting shares. To calculate 
the effective value of vesting equity in quarter q, we multiply the aggregate delta by Pq-1. We label 
the resulting measure VESTING, and it represents the dollar change in vesting equity for a 100% 
change in price. Appendix B gives a sample calculation for one CEO-quarter.  
 Our sample for the main analyses consists of 26,724 firm-CEO-quarters; see Table 1, Panel A 
for the detailed sample selection procedure. As reported in Table 1, Panel B, vesting equity has a 
mean of $785,000, with a mean of $566,000 ($178,000) coming from vesting options (shares). 
Vesting equity is zero for 62% of the firm-quarters in our sample. The coefficient of variation 
(standard deviation divided by the mean) of VESTING is 2.2 when computed separately for each 
CEO and then averaged, suggesting significant within-firm variation. Even setting aside the 
variation due to price, the average coefficients of variation are still sizable for the number of vesting 
shares and the number of vesting options (2.2 and 2.3, respectively).  
                                                 
8 For the Black-Scholes inputs of firm volatility, dividend yield, and risk-free rate, we use Equilar for consistency with 
our other compensation variables. For options that vest in year t, we use inputs as of the end of year t-1, and if 
unavailable, as of year t. If the data is missing in Equilar, we use year t-1’s inputs from ExecuComp, and year t-1’s 
inputs from Compustat, in that order. If absent from the three databases, we calculate volatility using the standard 
deviation of the firm’s stock returns over the past three years using the CRSP daily files; the risk-free rate using the 
Treasury Constant Maturity Rate with the closest term to a given option; and the dividend yield using the average of the 
firm’s dividend yield over the past five years using the Compustat annual files. If the expiry date is missing from Equilar 
(which occurs for 96 out of 29,948 unvested option grants), we delete the option. 
12 
 
2.2 Measurement of investment 
Our first measure of investment is the quarterly change in R&D ΔRD), scaled by lagged total 
assets. R&D is generally expensed and thus immediately reduces earnings. However, the cash flows 
created by R&D typically only arise in the long-term, and so it is difficult for even a forward-looking 
market to assess them immediately and incorporate them into the stock price. Consistent with this 
view, prior literature finds that managers use R&D cuts to increase short-run earnings.9 Following 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), we set missing R&D values to zero. The results are robust 
to removing observations with missing R&D, despite a much smaller sample. 
We also calculate the quarterly change in capital expenditure (ΔCAPEX) and net investment 
(ΔNETINV), scaled by lagged total assets. While CAPEX is taken directly from the cash flow 
statement, NETINV is the change in Net Property, Plant, and Equipment from the balance sheet. The 
latter is net of accumulated depreciation while the former is not. Although capital expenditure is not 
expensed, it depresses earnings through raising depreciation. In addition, it is typically financed by 
reducing cash or increasing debt. This increases a firm’s net interest expense, reducing earnings, and 
also worsens the firm’s solvency ratios which may enter into market valuations. As two additional 
measures, we consider the change in scaled R&D plus either measure of capital expenditure 
(ΔRDCAPEX and ΔRDNETINV). We use “investment” as an umbrella term to encapsulate the five 
different measures: RD, CAPEX, NETINV, RDCAPEX, and RDNETINV. The average scaled change 
in investment is very close to zero as shown in Table 1, Panel B.  
                                                 
9 Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) report that 80% of managers would cut discretionary expenditure on R&D, 
advertising, and maintenance to meet earnings targets. Bushee (1998) finds that investors who trade on earnings induce 
managers to cut R&D to meet earnings targets. Roychowdhury (2006) shows that firms manipulate earnings through 
real activities, including cuts in discretionary spending, to avoid reporting losses. Bhojraj et al. (2009) find that firms 
that beat analyst consensus forecasts by reducing discretionary spending enjoy a short-term stock price gain that is 
reversed in the long-run. Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) provide evidence that R&D is underpriced by the 
market, suggesting that a cut in R&D could boost the short-term stock price. These results are inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that a cut in R&D signals poor investment opportunities (Bebchuk and Stole (1993)). Any such effect would 
work against finding a negative association between R&D and vesting equity. 
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2.3 Control variables 
Our first set of controls contains other components of CEO pay. For a given quarter q of year t 
in which we measure vesting, we calculate all controls at the end of quarter q-1, unless otherwise 
specified. When a control is not available at the quarterly level, we proxy for it using the annual 
variable. We include VESTEDq-1, the sensitivity of all stock and options that had vested by the end 
of year t-1, and UNVESTEDq-1, the sensitivity of unvested equity at the end of year t-1 minus any 
equity scheduled to vest in year t.10 The direction of any correlation between these two variables and 
investment is unclear. While already-vested equity could deter investment if the CEO intends to sell 
it in the short run, his decision to hold onto vested equity is endogenous. For example, if the CEO 
has positive private information on investment opportunities, he may retain vested equity and also 
increase investment. While unvested equity may decrease myopia if it is scheduled to vest far in the 
future, it may exacerbate myopia if scheduled to vest shortly after q. Separately, Laux (2012) shows 
theoretically that unvested equity may exacerbate short-termism because the CEO takes actions to 
avoid being fired and forfeiting his unvested equity. Table 1, Panel B shows that the mean amount 
of unvested equity is $5,656,000, compared to the mean vesting equity of $785,000. This puts a 
limit on the amount of value erosion – and thus investment cuts – that a rational CEO will undertake 
in order to boost the short-term stock price. We also include two other compensation components: 
SALARYq-1 and BONUSq-1, the CEO’s salary and bonus in year t-1. 
The second set of controls are CEO characteristics: CEOAGEq-1 and CEOTENUREq-1 (CEO age 
and tenure of year t-1) and NEWCEOq (a new CEO indicator coded for year t). We include these 
controls for a number of reasons. First, career concerns may deter myopia if it has negative long-run 
consequences (as we explore further in Section 4). Second, Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016) find 
                                                 
10 In very rare cases, vesting equity can exceed unvested equity at the end of year t-1 because some unvested options 
have been canceled during the year, rather than having vested. We set UNVESTED to zero in such cases.  
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that investment increases with tenure. Third, Gopalan, Huang, and Maharjan (2015) show that 
vesting equity leads to an increased probability of CEO turnover, and so any change in investment 
may result from such transitions.  
Our final set of controls are firm-level; most are taken from Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist 
(2015). The first five variables proxy for investment opportunities: Tobin’s Q at the end of quarter 
q and q-1 (Qq, Qq-1), the compounded monthly market-adjusted stock return over quarter q-1 (MOMq-
1), the log of market equity (MVq-1), and firm age (FIRMAGEq-1 measured for year t-1). Note that 
size and age also proxy for financial constraints (Hadlock and Pierce (2010)). The remainder 
measure profitability and financial strength: cash and short-term investments (CASHq-1), book 
leverage (BOOKLEVq-1), retained earnings (RETEARNq-1), and the return-on-assets ratio (ROAq-1).  
3. Investment 
3.1 Equity vesting and investment 
We run the following ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regression on a panel of firms, omitting 
the firm subscript for brevity: 
 
ΔINVq = α + VESTINGq +  CONTROLSq-1 + q,           (3)    
 
where ΔINVq is the change in one of the five investment variables from quarter q-1 to q. 
We measure VESTING over quarter q, the same time period as ΔINV, because the CEO knows 
at the start of quarter q how much equity will vest over that quarter, and so may cut investment 
accordingly. Our hypothesis is that  < 0. The control variables CONTROLS are as discussed in 
Section 2.3. We use year fixed effects to control for common shocks to investment opportunities, 
quarter fixed effects to control for potential seasonalities in vesting and investment, firm fixed 
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effects to control for firm-level heterogeneity in investment opportunities, and cluster standard errors 
at the firm level.11 The inclusion of firm fixed effects means that our identification is based on 
within-firm variation in VESTING, which is sizable as discussed in Section 2.1.  
Table 2 shows that vesting equity is associated with declines in all five measures of investment 
growth, significant at the 1% level for four measures and the 5% level for the fifth. A one standard 
deviation increase in VESTING is associated with an annualized 0.2% decline in ΔRDNETINV, 11% 
of the average investment-to-assets ratio. This corresponds to a decline in investment of $1.8 million 
per year, based on the median total assets of $856 million. To our knowledge, these are the first 
results to link a measure of the CEO’s short-term incentives to real investment decisions. These 
magnitudes are economically meaningful but also plausible: too large a decline may prompt the 
board to step in and block it; in addition, as noted earlier, the CEO’s unvested equity will limit the 
amount of investment cuts that a rational CEO will undertake.  
Turning to the other covariates, UNVESTED is insignificant in all specifications, consistent with 
the theoretical ambiguity discussed in Section 2.3. VESTED is negatively significant at the 10% 
level in two specifications and insignificant in the other three. These coefficients are difficult to 
interpret since the CEO’s holdings of vested equity are endogenous, as discussed earlier. Investment 
growth is generally positively related to investment opportunities, as measured by Tobin’s Q and 
momentum, and negatively related to firm size. It is positively related to cash holdings and the 
negative of book leverage, two measures of the firm’s ability to fund investment. The three CEO 
characteristics (age, tenure, and a new CEO indicator) are insignificant in all specifications.  
Our use of vesting equity is motivated by it being determined by equity grants made several 
years prior. While true for grants with time-based vesting, performance-based vesting is becoming 
                                                 
11 Our results are robust to replacing firm fixed effects with CEO fixed effects to capture CEO preferences towards 
investment (e.g. from overconfidence or risk aversion), or to excluding firm fixed effects. 
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more common, and performance that triggers vesting may be correlated with investment 
opportunities. Bettis et al. (2010) find that 46% of performance-based vesting provisions are 
contingent on stock price thresholds, twice as frequent as the next category. Since high stock returns 
likely indicate good investment opportunities, stock price-based vesting would yield a positive 
relationship between vesting equity and investment, contrary to Table 2; we also control for past 
stock returns. However, reverse causality may be a concern if the provision is contingent on 
accounting thresholds (23% of cases): investment cuts may increase earnings and trigger vesting.  
We conduct two robustness checks to address this concern. First, we recalculate VESTING 
including only time-based vesting grants. We remove post-2006 grants labeled “performance-based,” 
“contingent,” or “accelerated,” post-2006 grants with unknown vesting schedule, and pre-2006 
grants, and denote the resulting measure as VESTING_TB. Table 3, Panel A reports results similar 
to those in Table 2, with the coefficient on VESTING_TB being negative and significant in all five 
specifications. Second, Gopalan et al. (2014) report that 35.3% of stock in the Equilar dataset 
exhibits performance-based vesting, compared with only 1.9% of options, and so the concern is 
significant for stock but not options. Table 1, Panel B shows that the mean value of vesting options 
is over 3 times that of vesting stock, and so VESTING is predominantly comprised of options, for 
which performance-based vesting is rare. In addition, in Table 3, Panel B, we replace VESTING with 
the separate variables VESTINGSTOCK and VESTINGOPT. Both variables are negative in all 
specifications, with the former significant in two and the latter significant in four. Thus, the results 
remain strong for vesting options, for which performance-based vesting is a less significant concern.  
3.2 Equity sales and investment 
The analysis in Section 3.1 shows a negative effect of vesting equity on investment. Our 
proposed mechanism is that vesting equity increases the CEO’s equity sales and thus his concern 
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for the current stock price. This section examines this economic mechanism directly by using vesting 
equity as an instrument for equity sales in a 2SLS analysis. Two of the properties of vesting equity 
discussed earlier – its high correlation with equity sales and its determination by equity grants 
several years prior – are analogous to the relevance criterion and the exclusion restriction for a valid 
instrument. We run the following 2SLS procedure: 
 
EQUITYSOLDq = α1 + 1VESTINGq + CONTROLSq-1 + 1q,      (4)    
ΔINVq = α2 + 2 FIT_EQUITYSOLDq + CONTROLSq-1 + 2q,     (5)    
 
We calculate the number of shares sold by the CEO in a given quarter using Form 4 filed with 
the SEC and compiled by the Thomson Financial Insider Trading database. This database covers 
both standard sales and sales of shares acquired upon option exercises. We multiply the number of 
shares sold during quarter q by Pq-1 to form EQUITYSOLDq, the dollar value of equity sold. Similar 
to VESTING, EQUITYSOLD is zero for 68% of the firm-quarters in our sample. 
The first column in Table 4 presents the first-stage results. The coefficient on VESTING is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. A one standard deviation increase in VESTING is associated 
with a rise in EQUITYSOLD by $140,000, 16% of the average level. The underidentification test 
strongly rejects the null of no correlation between our instrument and equity sales – the Cragg-
Donald F-statistic is 53.03, significantly higher than the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value of 
16.38 for a 10% maximal bias of the instrumental variable estimator relative to OLS. The result that 
vesting equity is correlated with same-quarter equity sales is consistent with diversification motives, 
and also with Edmans et al.’s (2016) finding that CEOs typically sell equity in the vesting month. 
The remaining columns show the second-stage results. The coefficients on instrumented equity 
sales (FIT_EQUITYSOLD) are negative and significant at the 1% level in two regressions and at the 
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5% level in three, consistent with the reduced-form regressions in Table 2. In terms of economic 
significance, an interquartile change in equity sales is associated with an annualized decline in 
ΔRDNETINV of 0.2%12. In untabulated results, this decline is insignificant and close to zero when 
conducting an OLS regression of investment growth on actual equity sales (and controls). This 
suggests that the main endogeneity issue with using actual sales is likely measurement error: actual 
sales are a mismeasured proxy for anticipated equity sales because they include unanticipated 
liquidity sales which are unlikely to drive investment.  
4. Alternative Hypotheses 
The results of Tables 2-4 show that vesting equity is significantly associated with declines in 
investment growth. One interpretation, consistent with our motivation, is that short-term stock price 
concerns lead the CEO to inefficiently reduce positive-NPV investments (the myopia hypothesis). 
However, the results also admit alternative explanations. One is the efficiency hypothesis: CEOs 
overinvest on average, and short-term stock price concerns induce them to cut wasteful expenditure, 
similar to the CEO restraint studied by Jacobsen (2014). Under this hypothesis, the reduction in 
investment is efficient, i.e. increases rather than decreases long-run value. Note that this hypothesis 
is still consistent with a causal interpretation, i.e. that CEO contracts have real effects. A second is 
the timing hypothesis: boards design contracts so that equity vests when investment opportunities 
decline. This explanation requires that boards forecast quarter-level declines in investment 
opportunities several years in advance.  
                                                 
12 The interpretation of economic significance in the 2SLS model is difficult because we do not observe the distribution 
of anticipated sales (our variable of interest). The dispersion of actual sales is likely larger than that of anticipated sales 
if actual sales contain an unanticipated component. To mitigate this issue, we use an interquartile range of actual sales 
rather than its standard deviation as the latter would be more susceptible to outliers in unanticipated sales. 
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Although it is difficult to fully differentiate between these explanations, we conduct a number 
of tests to evaluate them. We first investigate the timing hypothesis. In Table 5, following Gopalan, 
Huang, and Maharjan (2015), we keep only equity grants made at least two years prior to the end of 
quarter q when calculating vesting equity; we call this measure VESTING>2Y. Since it is likely 
harder for boards to forecast investment opportunities two or more years in advance, the timing 
hypothesis suggests a weaker relation between VESTING>2Y and investment. To be conservative, 
we also remove all grants made prior to 2006, for which we cannot observe the grant date. Many of 
these grants will have been awarded more than two years before quarter q, and so removing them 
reduces power. Nevertheless, VESTING>2Y is negatively significant at the 1% level in two 
specifications, the 5% level in two, and the 10% level in one.  
To examine the efficiency hypothesis, we investigate the link between vesting and 
contemporaneous changes in operating performance. If stock price concerns induce the CEO to 
increase efficiency, this is likely to manifest in not only the scrapping of inefficient investment 
projects, but also increases in efficiency in other dimensions – for example, higher sales and lower 
non-investment expenses. We calculate three measures to gauge the extent to which the CEO is 
improving efficiency more generally: SGR, sales growth from quarter q-4 to q, the change in COGS 
(the cost of goods sold-to-sales ratio) from quarter q-1 to q, and the change in OPEXP (the operating 
expenses-to-sales ratio) from quarter q-1 to q. Just as cuts in investment are not definitively an 
indicator of myopia (rather than efficiency), it is impossible to identify cuts in other expenses that 
are definitively an indicator of efficiency (rather than myopia). However, cuts in COGS and OPEXP 
are less likely to be at the expense of long-run value than cuts in investment, since many of these 
expenses do not improve long-term value – e.g. over-spending on raw materials due to inefficient 
sourcing or production. Indeed, investors and analysts typically use the cost of goods sold and 
operating expense ratios to measure a firm’s efficiency. We use the same controls as in Table 2.  
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Table 6 demonstrates no significant relationship between vesting equity and any of the three 
performance measures. While far from definitive, these results are not consistent with the hypothesis 
that vesting equity induces the CEO to engage in general improvements in efficiency.  
Next, we conduct three sets of cross-sectional analyses which shed further light on all three 
hypotheses. The first set of analyses split the sample based on firms’ institutional ownership and 
block ownership. Our motivation is that, since institutions and blockholders have larger stakes than 
retail investors, they have stronger incentives to acquire and trade on information about long-run 
value rather than passively relying on short-term earnings numbers (as shown theoretically by 
Edmans 2009). Indeed, Aghion, van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) find that institutional ownership 
has a positive causal effect on innovation. Thus, under the myopia hypothesis, investment cuts 
induced by vesting should decline with institutional or block ownership: since institutions and 
blockholders place greater weight on long-run value than short-term earnings when evaluating the 
firm, a CEO attempting to boost the stock price has less incentive to increase short-term earnings at 
the expense of long-run value. In contrast, the predictions under the efficiency hypothesis are more 
ambiguous: they depend on whether equity incentives and ownership have independent, 
complementary, or substitute effects on CEO behavior, and it is difficult to predict the direction of 
complementarity ex ante. For example, if blockholders complement the effects of equity incentives, 
we might see stronger vesting-induced efficiency improvements in high-block ownership firms.13 
The same ambiguity arises for the timing hypothesis: if blockholders and equity incentives are 
complements, equity incentives have greater effects in the presence of blockholders, and so it is 
more important for firms with blockholders to ensure that equity does not vest while investment 
opportunities are strong. 
                                                 
13 Blockholders may trade on information on the firm’s fundamental value, and thus sell (buy more) shares if the firm 
is inefficient (efficient), affecting the current stock price (Edmans 2009). If the manager has vesting equity and thus 
expects to sell at the current stock price, he is more affected by blockholder trades.  
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In Table 7, Panel A we present our main investment regressions (similar to those in Table 2) 
with the two aggregate investment measures (ΔRDCAPEX and ΔRDNETINV) as the dependent 
variables, but estimated separately in subsamples split at the sample median based on the fraction 
of total institutional ownership (IO), the fraction of ownership held by all blockholders (BLOCKO), 
and the number of blockholders (NBLOCK). We define a blockholder as an investor who owns at 
least 1% of the outstanding equity.14 
Based on both aggregate investment measures, the link between vesting equity and investment 
cuts is stronger in firms with lower institutional ownership, lower blockholder ownership, and fewer 
blockholders. For example, using ΔRDNETINV, the coefficient on VESTING is -0.437 in the low-
IO sample (significant at the 1% level) and an insignificant -0.069 in the high-IO sample. A chi-
squared test shows that the two coefficients are significantly different at the 5% level. We find 
similar results using BLOCKO and NBLOCK. An alternative methodology is to estimate the 
investment regressions in the full sample and include the ownership measures and their interactions 
with VESTING as additional regressors. Table OA1 in the Online Appendix finds consistent results: 
the interaction coefficients of vesting with ownership variables are positive and statistically 
significant. Overall, we find that vesting induces stronger investment cuts in samples with low 
institutional or block ownership. This finding is consistent with the myopia hypothesis, but has less 
clear implications for the efficiency and timing hypotheses, as discussed earlier. 
The second set of analyses split the sample based on CEO age. CEO age is often used as a 
(negative) proxy for career concerns as younger CEOs are more likely to be concerned about their 
                                                 
14 While 5% is typically used as a threshold, Edmans and Holderness (2016) argue that this is because investors need to 
file a Schedule 13D/G when crossing 5%, rather than any theoretical justification. This threshold will miss many 
blockholders, particularly when analyzing large firms, for which a 1% stake will comprise a significant dollar holding. 
Since we obtain our ownership data from Thomson Reuters Section 13F holdings rather than Schedule 13D/G filings, 
we are not limited to the 5% threshold. The results continue to hold with a 5% threshold, although are slightly weaker, 
consistent with this threshold leading to us missing some blockholders.  
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long-term labor market reputations (Gibbons and Murphy 1992). Under the myopia hypothesis, the 
investment growth cuts are inefficient and so may worsen the CEO’s long-term reputation; thus, 
younger CEOs should be less likely to undertake them. If the investment cuts are efficient, it is less 
obvious why they should be less valuable to younger CEOs. Under the timing hypothesis, there is 
no clear reason why the board’s ability to time equity grants will depend on CEO age. 
Consistent with the myopia prediction, our results are generally weaker in the subsample of 
younger CEOs. For example, based on Panel A of Table 7, using ΔRDNETINV, the coefficient on 
VESTING is significantly negative in the high-CEOAGE subsample and insignificant in the low-
CEOAGE subsample. The two coefficients are significantly different at the 1% level. In our full 
sample test in Table OA1, the coefficient on the interaction between VESTING and CEOAGE is 
significantly negative at the 10% level in the ΔRDNETINV regression. The results are weaker using 
ΔRDCAPEX: the difference in coefficients on VESTING in the split tests and the interaction term in 
the full sample regression are both insignificant. Overall, this test provides some evidence that the 
tendency to reduce investment growth around vesting increases with CEO age.  
Our third set of sample splits uses firm size and firm age, which can be interpreted as (negative) 
proxies for investment opportunities. Under this interpretation, younger and smaller firms might 
find it more costly to increase the short-term stock price by cutting investment growth.15 This could 
be the case whether the investment cuts are myopic or efficient, so the test does not help us 
distinguish between the two explanations. However, the timing explanation suggests the opposite 
effect: if boards attempt to time vesting to coincide with declines in investment opportunities, this 
consideration is more important in firms with higher investment opportunities to begin with. 
                                                 
15 This may occur, for example, if investment opportunities are lumpy, or firms are capital constrained, and so the last 
investment taken by an (optimizing) firm is more valuable in a firm with better investment opportunities. 
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We find that investment growth is significantly negatively related to VESTING for larger and 
older firms, and the relation is generally insignificant for smaller and younger firms. The difference 
between the coefficients on VESTING is significant for the age split using ΔRDNETINV. The 
interaction between VESTING and firm age is significant in the full sample regressions using either 
investment measure. While the difference between the coefficients on VESTING is insignificant for 
the size split in Table 7, Panel A, the interaction between VESTING and size is significantly negative 
in the full sample regression in Table OA1. These results are consistent with the myopia and 
efficiency hypotheses but less consistent with the timing hypothesis. 
Panel B of Table 7 repeats the subsample split analyses by orthogonalizing the splitting variables 
with respect to firm size (except for size itself), because most of these variables are likely to be 
highly correlated with firm size. All results continue to hold and become even stronger for some 
tests (for example, the coefficients are now significantly different in the firm age split). 
A final way to shed light on the three alternative hypotheses is to study the link between 
VESTING and investment changes in future quarters. Under the myopia hypothesis, the CEO cuts 
(or delays the initiation of) value-creating investment projects in quarters with high vesting equity. 
Since these projects are value-creating, he may still initiate them in future quarters when VESTING 
is low. Under the efficiency hypothesis, the CEO cuts inefficient investment projects in a quarter 
with high VESTING. Since these projects are inefficient, he would be less likely to restart them in 
future quarters. Under the timing hypothesis, if the board schedules vesting to coincide with a quarter 
in which investment opportunities decline, the fall in investment growth should be permanent, unless 
the decline in investment opportunities is only in that quarter and subsequently rebounds. 
Table 8 conducts this dynamic analysis. Panels A, B, and C regress investment growth in quarter 
q on VESTING in quarter q-1, q-2, and q-3, respectively. The results provide some evidence that the 
decline in investment growth reverses in each of the next three quarters, as suggested by the myopia 
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hypothesis, although the coefficients are not consistently significant across all investment measures. 
The partial reversal of the investment declines documented in Table 8 suggests that vesting causes 
firms to delay investment to subsequent quarters. It is difficult to estimate how costly such delays 
are to shareholders, but the costs are likely higher for firms in growing or competitive industries in 
which investment opportunities change more quickly over time.  Indeed, the Table 7 finding that 
vesting-induced investment declines are smaller in firms with strong investment opportunities may 
be because such declines are costlier, even if subsequently reversed. 
5. Earnings Guidance and Earnings Announcements 
5.1 Analyst forecast revisions 
The results of Section 3 show that a CEO cuts investment in quarters in which large amounts of 
equity vest, and sells equity in the same quarters. Since the earnings of quarter q (which benefit from 
the investment cut) are announced after quarter-end, these results suggest that the CEO may be 
taking additional actions to communicate the expected earnings increase before the earnings 
announcement, to raise the stock price in quarter q itself and thus improve the conditions for quarter 
q equity sales. Examples of such actions include issuing earnings guidance, public disclosures, press 
releases, or interviews. We assess the extent and effectiveness of these actions by studying the 
increase in analyst consensus earnings forecasts within quarter q. We hypothesize that VESTING is 
positively associated with the revision in analyst forecasts over the same quarter.  
We calculate three dependent variables: ALYREVq is the latest mean analyst consensus forecast 
prior to the end of quarter q minus the latest consensus forecast prior to the end of quarter q-1, scaled 
by the stock price at the end of quarter q-1; ALYREV2q is similar but uses the latest consensus 
forecast prior to the last equity sale in quarter q (rather than prior to the end of quarter q); and 
ALYREV3q uses the latest consensus forecast prior to the last equity sale in quarter q (or prior to 
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quarter-end if there is no equity sale in quarter q). We require a firm to have at least five analysts to 
increase the likelihood of forecast revision. We continue to include compensation controls (unvested 
and vested equity, salary, and bonus), CEO characteristics (CEO age, tenure, and the new CEO 
indicator), year, quarter, and firm fixed effects, plus market equity, Tobin’s Q, and return-on-assets. 
We add three controls that have been shown to affect the manager’s propensity to provide guidance 
to analysts (Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2011): IOq-1, the percentage of institutional ownership 
at the end of quarter q-1, ANALYSTq, the number of analysts following the firm in quarter q, and 
ANDISPq, analyst forecast dispersion in quarter q, calculated as the standard deviation of analyst 
forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean consensus forecast. We also include HORIZON, 
the mean average forecasting horizon (the number of days between an analyst forecast and the 
earnings announcement), to measure forecast staleness. 
Table 9 presents the results. All three measures of analyst forecast revisions are positively and 
significantly related to vesting equity at the 5% level. This suggests that vesting equity is associated 
with an increase in the market’s earnings expectations within the same quarter, consistent with the 
myopia hypothesis: by communicating the earnings increase resulting from his investment cut 
within the same quarter, the manager can increase the payoff from his equity sales. The results are 
harder to reconcile with the timing hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, boards are able to forecast 
quarterly-level declines in investment opportunities several years in advance. If so, it is reasonable 
to believe that analysts will be aware of these declines (and the resulting earnings increases) by the 
start of the quarters in which they actually occur. Thus, there is no clear reason to expect increases 
in analyst earnings forecasts over the same quarters.  
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5.2 Earnings guidance 
The advantage of studying analyst forecast revisions is that they are comprehensive: they capture 
various channels through which the manager may communicate earnings news to the market, such 
as earnings guidance, public disclosures, press releases, or interviews. However, analyst forecasts 
measure the outcome of managerial communication, rather than the actual act of communication. 
This section thus directly studies the usage of one specific communication channel – earnings 
guidance. We examine this action because it is a major avenue through which managers 
communicate earnings-related news to the market outside mandatory reporting (Healy and Palepu 
2001) and guide analysts (Matsumoto 2002): indeed, Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) find that 
47% of analysts who issue a forecast at the start of a quarter revise it within five days of an earnings 
guidance event. In addition, it is a public event for which data is available in I/B/E/S. As a result, 
we can study whether the manager’s equity sales are concentrated shortly after an earnings guidance 
event, as predicted by the myopia hypothesis. 
We define four variables that measure the frequency of guidance events: POSNEUEG, POSEG, 
and NEGEG count positive or neutral, positive, and negative guidance events in quarter q, 
respectively, and EG counts all guidance events.16 We use the same controls and fixed effects as in 
Table 9. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 show that VESTING is significantly positively related to 
the number of positive and neutral guidance events, and positive guidance events, respectively. 
Based on column (2), a one standard deviation increase in vesting equity is associated with a 0.04 
increase in the number of positive guidance events in a quarter, compared to the average quarterly 
change of 0.07. As a falsification test, column (3) shows that VESTING is unrelated to the number 
                                                 
16 We define positive guidance as items coded by I/B/E/S as “Beat Consensus,” “Match Consensus,” or “Positive Sales 
Comparison,” neutral guidance as items coded as “Announce Charge” (i.e., announcing the inclusion or exclusion of a 
charge), “Announce Gain” (i.e., announcing the inclusion or exclusion of a gain), or “Management Guidance,” and 
negative guidance as items coded as “Earnings Shortfall,” “Negative Sale Comparison,” or “Restatement.” 
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of negative guidance events; similarly, column (4) shows that it is unrelated to the number of total 
guidance events. We separately find that positive guidance events are associated with an average 
2.5% market-adjusted announcement return in the [-1, +1] window.17  
Positive earnings guidance improves the conditions for equity sales if the CEO is able to sell 
equity shortly afterwards. Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) find that 78% of firms have blackout 
policies that restrict the CEO from trading within certain periods. If earnings guidance took place 
during these periods, the CEO would not be able to benefit by selling equity immediately afterwards. 
Table 11 thus investigates the extent to which the CEO’s equity sales within a given quarter are 
concentrated shortly after positive guidance, thus allowing him to benefit from it. Finding 
concentration would be consistent with two scenarios. First, the firm has a blackout policy, but 
schedules earnings guidance to fall within or just before a window that permits trading. Indeed, in 
our sample, 80% of guidance events are concurrent with earnings announcements,18 and Bettis et al. 
(2000) find that the most common blackout policy allows executives to trade only within a [3, 12] 
window after an earnings announcement. Second, the firm does not have a blackout policy, and the 
CEO chooses to sell shortly after positive guidance. Our goal is to test whether the CEO is able to 
sell equity shortly after guidance, which could occur under either scenario. Regardless of whether 
any post-guidance sales are “voluntary” (due to the CEO choosing to sell after guidance) or 
“mechanical” (due to the opening of a trading window), the CEO is still able to benefit from the 
positive guidance event.  
Table 11 calculates the proportion of total equity sales in a quarter that occur within a [0,2], 
[0,5], [0,10], [0,15], or [0,20] window around a positive guidance event. We find that these 
                                                 
17 Note that the 2.5% announcement return to positive guidance holds regardless of whether we exclude guidance events 
bundled with earnings announcements. 
18 It is well documented in the accounting literature that firms bundle earnings guidance with earnings announcements 
of the prior quarters. For example, Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) note that bundled forecasts have evolved to become 
the most common type of earnings guidance, occurring 70-80% of the time (consistent with our finding).  
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proportions are large: for example, 56% of equity sales occur within [0,15] and 67% of equity sales 
occur within [0,20]. To assess the magnitude of concentration, i.e. whether the CEO sells more 
shortly after positive guidance than on other days, we compare these fractions to a hypothetical 
scenario in which quarterly sales were not concentrated but instead evenly distributed across trading 
days within a quarter. There are on average 1.3 positive guidance event dates per quarter. Thus, if 
sales were not concentrated, 33% of sales (i.e., 1.3 × 16/number of trading days in a quarter) should 
occur within a [0,15] window, significantly lower than 43%. For all five windows, the proportion of 
equity sales that occur within the window is significantly higher (at the 1% level) than if sales were 
not concentrated. Thus, CEO sales are concentrated shortly after positive guidance events, and so 
the CEO is able to benefit from positive guidance.  
As a back-of-the-envelope calculation of how positive guidance increases the proceeds from 
equity sales shortly afterwards, the average equity sold within 20 trading days of a positive guidance 
event is $958,414. Multiplied by the 2.5% announcement return to positive guidance, this yields 
$23,960, in line with prior research which also finds that modest gains can have a large effect on 
behavior, even for wealthy individuals such as CEOs and directors.19 Moreover, this benefit only 
applies to earnings guidance, not other channels through which the CEO may communicate earnings 
information ahead of the announcement, and is only an average effect: some CEOs may not sell 
equity upon vesting if they do not have diversification concerns.  
 
                                                 
19 Adams and Ferreira (2008) find that board meeting fees (which average $1,000) affect director attendance, even 
though preparing for and attending a meeting involves significant effort. Yermack (1997) finds that the median gain 
over 1992-4 from timing of option grants was $11,100 after 20 trading days and $15,600 after 50 trading days. In 2008 
terms (the mid-point of our sample period), these figures become $16,549 and $23,258. Lie (2005) subsequently found 
that such timing results from illegal backdating (and so a high benefit should be needed to bear the legal risk of grant 
timing), while investment cuts are legal. Meulbroek (1992) reports a median per-security gain to illegal insider trading 
of $17,628 over 1980-9, i.e. $35,267 in 2008 terms. Thus, the gains calculated above are in line with those from 
backdating and illegal insider trading; since they are not illegal, the risk-adjusted returns are likely higher. 
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5.3 Earnings surprises 
While Table 9 shows that vesting equity is associated with an increase in analyst earnings 
forecasts, we now study how close the revised forecast is to actual earnings. This analysis sheds 
light on how much of the earnings increase the manager communicates prior to the announcement. 
When the manager decides how much to communicate, he faces a trade-off. The benefit of 
increasing analyst earnings forecasts through positive communication is that it boosts the price at 
which he can sell equity in quarter q. The cost is that it will be harder to beat the forecast when he 
subsequently announces earnings. A large literature (see, e.g., the survey of Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal 2005) shows that managers perceive a discontinuous cost when the firm moves from 
meeting to missing the forecast, such as a decline in the stock price and managerial reputation.  
A potential implication of this trade-off is that managers with vesting equity tailor the level of 
pre-announcement communication to maximize their proceeds from equity sales in quarter q, while 
trying to ensure that they do not miss the analyst forecast. We thus hypothesize that vesting equity 
increases the frequency with which the manager narrowly beats the forecast at announcement. 
Missing the forecast would suggest that the manager communicated too much positive information; 
beating it by a wide margin would suggest that he could have communicated more and thus sold his 
equity at a higher price. 
We define three variables to capture the manager’s tendency to beat analyst consensus forecasts. 
BEATq is one for quarters in which the firm’s reported EPS (from I/B/E/S) beats the consensus and 
zero otherwise; BEATBELOW1q equals one if the firm beats it by 1 cent or less; and BEATABOVE1q 
equals one if the firm beats it by more than 1 cent. As before, we require a firm to have at least five 
analysts. For each analyst, we take the latest forecast before the announcement. Here, we measure 
vesting equity from the start of quarter q to the actual earnings announcement date (rather than the 
end of quarter q) because the earnings of quarter q are not announced until after quarter-end. As in 
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Table 9, we control for other compensation components, CEO characteristics, year and quarter fixed 
effects, plus MV, Q, ROA, IO, ANALYST, ANDISP, and HORIZON. We follow the literature (e.g. 
McVay, Nagar, and Tang 2006) by estimating probit regressions with Fama-French 12-industry 
fixed effects; we do not use firm fixed effects due to the incidental parameters problem. (The results 
of Tables 9 and 10 hold using either firm or industry fixed effects.)  
Column (1) of Table 12 shows that vesting equity is positively associated with the likelihood of 
beating analyst forecasts, and significant at the 1% level. Columns (2) and (3) show that vesting 
equity is significantly positively related to the likelihood of beating the analyst forecast by up to one 
cent, but not more than one cent. A one standard deviation increase in vesting equity is associated 
with a 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of beating the analyst forecast by up to one cent, 
compared to the unconditional likelihood of 11.1%. These results are consistent with the CEO 
communicating a level of positive earnings news that allows him to maximize his benefit from the 
investment cuts without creating a large risk of missing the forecast. 
6. Robustness Tests 
This section describes robustness tests for our headline result in Table 2. We first rerun the 
regressions in Table 2 excluding controls. Table OA2 shows that the coefficient on VESTING 
remains negative and significant at at least the 5% level in all five specifications, and that the point 
estimates are economically similar.  
We next turn to robustness tests on the calculation of VESTING. Our main specifications convert 
options to share equivalents using their deltas, which depend on the options’ time-to-maturity. 
However, if CEOs exercise their options shortly after they vest, their effective horizons are shorter. 
In Table OA3, Panel A, we instead use intrinsic values: we assign a delta of one to all in-the-money 
options and zero to all out-of-the-money options, because only the former would be exercised 
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immediately upon vesting. The results are unchanged. We use deltas in our main specification as, 
even if an option is out of the money at the start of the quarter (when we calculate our deltas), it may 
become in the money later in the quarter when it vests, and the delta captures this likelihood. In 
Panel B, we calculate option deltas assuming that all options have the same (short) maturity of one 
year, and again obtain consistent results. 
Another concern is that VESTINGq is correlated with Pq-1 and thus investment opportunities at 
the start of quarter q. Such correlation could stem from two sources. First, VESTING is the delta of 
vesting equity multiplied by Pq-1. The multiplication is necessary to obtain an incentive measure that 
reflects the CEO’s wealth gain from increasing the stock price by a percentage (rather than dollar) 
amount. Second, the delta of vesting options is itself increasing in the stock price and thus 
investment opportunities. Such a channel will lead to a positive correlation between VESTING and 
investment, the opposite of what we find. In addition, we already include the price-based controls 
Qq, Qq-1, MVq-1, and MOMq-1. To address any residual correlation, rather than using an option’s 
actual delta, Panel C assumes a delta of 0.7, which is the mean delta in our sample. In Panel D, we 
assume that all options are at the money, which removes the dependence of the estimated delta on 
the current stock price, but still allows for deltas to vary across firms with other inputs. The results 
are unchanged. 
The next set of robustness tests concerns the assumptions made to estimate the vesting dates of 
stock. Our first alternative methodology defines a variant of VESTING using only time-based post-
2006 awards (as opposed to all post-2006 awards) in the first step. Our second alternative 
methodology uses only time-based post-2006 awards in the first step and only grant dates of 
performance-based post-2006 awards in the second step. Table OA4, Panels A and B report results 
using the two variants of VESTING, which are barely affected. Further, as shown in Table 3, Panel 
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B, the results are robust to using only vesting options, which have expiry dates that we can use to 
infer vesting dates precisely.  
In Table OA5, we add as an additional control VEGA, the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for 
a 100% change in stock return volatility, to control for the CEO’s incentives to take risky 
investments. The results remain robust.  
Finally, Table OA6 uses the level of, rather than change in, investment as the dependent variable. 
The coefficients are negative in all specifications, and significant at the 5% level in one and the 10% 
level in another. The stronger results for changes in investment may arise because it is likely less 
costly for a firm to reduce the growth rate than the level of investment. Reducing the level of R&D 
typically involves laying off employees or scaling down research programs that are already 
underway; reducing the growth rate may be achievable by lowering the rate of new hires or new 
R&D program initiations (but not necessarily turning it negative). Reducing the level of capital 
expenditure would be similarly costly if capital expenditures (e.g. building a new plant) are part of 
multi-quarter programs. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper studies the link between real investment decisions and the CEO’s short-term concerns. 
Myopia theories predict that short-term stock price concerns may induce the CEO to reduce positive-
NPV investments to boost earnings and thus the stock price. Such theories are difficult to test, partly 
due to the difficulty in measuring myopic incentives. The standard proxies for CEO incentives 
measure a CEO’s overall level of equity holdings, rather than his concern for the short-term stock 
price in particular. Moreover, they depend on the amount of equity that a CEO has chosen to hold 
onto, which is an endogenous decision. 
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We introduce a new measure of the CEO’s short-term concerns: the amount of equity scheduled 
to vest in a given quarter. We show that vesting equity is significantly negatively related to the 
growth in five measures of investment. The results continue to hold when removing all equity 
granted within the last two years, suggesting that they are not driven by boards timing equity to vest 
in the quarter when investment opportunities decline. Vesting equity is unrelated to reductions in 
other expenses or improvements in operating performance, providing suggestive evidence that the 
reductions in investment are myopic rather than part of a general program to increase efficiency. 
Under either interpretation, our results suggest that CEO contracts affect real decisions, and thus 
contribute more broadly to the general literature on executive compensation. We also find that 
vesting equity is significantly positively related to analyst forecast revisions and positive earnings 
guidance, consistent with the CEO’s attempts to benefit from equity sales in the same quarter.  
While the lack of a relationship between vesting equity and improvements in other measures of 
operating performance is less supportive of the efficiency hypothesis, it is difficult to rule it out 
conclusively. Moreover, even if the reduction in investment induced by the CEO’s contract is 
inefficient, this does not mean that his contract is inefficient overall. Boards of directors may 
recognize that short-vesting equity leads to underinvestment, but trade this off against the costs of 
longer-term contracts. Such contracts may expose the manager to risks outside his control, and cause 
him to demand a risk premium.  
If the link between vesting equity and investment growth results from myopia, our results have 
implications for CEO contract design.  Policymakers often focus on the level of pay: for example, 
Dodd-Frank requires firms to disclose the ratio of CEO to median employee pay. However, it is the 
structure of pay, rather than its level, that is critical in determining managerial incentives. Our results 
point to the vesting horizon as an important element of pay structure, particularly when incentivizing 
long-term investment decisions such as R&D. Most directly, our paper suggests that investors and 
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boards take note of vesting schedules and scrutinize CEO decisions when large amounts of equity 
is vesting. It also implies that boards might consider extending the vesting horizon of equity, 
potentially beyond retirement, and spreading vesting dates equally across the four quarters of a year 
rather than concentrating them on the grant anniversary.20 
More broadly, our measure of short-term incentives – vesting equity – is relatively easy to 
construct, and potentially usable in wider contexts than investment decisions. In addition, in future 
research it may be interesting to extend the analysis of short-term incentives to include other 
contracting components, such as bonuses tied to a firm’s accounting performance (Li and Wang 
2016) and turnover risk (Cziraki and Groen-Xu 2016). 
                                                 
20 For example, the UK government’s November 2016 Green Paper on corporate governance reform proposes replacing 
bonuses based on financial targets with restricted share awards with long vesting periods. 
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Appendix A: Definition of variables  
This appendix describes the calculation of variables used in the core analysis. Underlined variables refer 
to variable names within Compustat. t indexes the year to which quarter q belongs. 
Variable Definition 
CEO incentives from equity holdings  
VESTINGq The dollar change in the value of vesting equity in quarter q for a 100% change in 
the stock price, calculated as VESTINGSTOCK (the number of vesting shares in 
quarter q × stock price at the end of quarter q-1) plus VESTINGOPT (aggregated 
delta of vesting options in quarter q × stock price at the end of quarter q-1). Vesting 
options are assigned to quarter q based on expiry dates, and vesting shares are 
assigned to quarter q based on grant dates. The delta of an option is calculated using 
the Black-Scholes formula. For options that vest in quarter q of year t, the inputs 
(i.e., dividend yield, risk-free interest rate, and volatility) to the Black-Scholes 
formula are those associated with a firm’s newly-awarded options in year t-1 from 
Equilar, and if unavailable, replaced with those associated with a firm’s newly-
awarded options in year t from Equilar, followed by year t-1’s inputs from 
ExecuComp (or year t’s if year t-1’s are missing), and by year t-1’s inputs from 
Compustat (or year t’s if year t-1’s are missing), in that order; 
VESTING_TBq Similar to VESTINGq, except that it includes only post-2006 time-based vesting 
grants; 
VESTING>2Yq Similar to VESTINGq, except that it includes only post-2006 grants that are awarded 
at least two years prior to the end of quarter q; 
UNVESTEDq-1 The dollar change in the value of unvested equity in year t-1 for a 100% change in 
the stock price, calculated as the sum of max[UNVESTEDSTOCK (the total number 
of unvested shares including unvested long-term incentive plan shares × stock 
price, both at the end of year t-1) - VESTINGSTOCK (the total number of vesting 
share including unvested long-term incentive plan shares in year t × stock price at 
the end of year t-1), 0] and max[UNVESTEDOPT (aggregated delta of unvested 
options × stock price, both at the end of year t-1) – VESTINGOPT (aggregated delta 
of vesting options in year t × stock price at the end of year t-1), 0]. Delta is 
calculated similarly as above; 
VESTEDq-1 The dollar change in the value of already-vested equity in year t-1 for a 100% 
change in the stock price, calculated as VESTEDSTOCK (the number of already-
vested shares × stock price, both at the end of year t-1) plus VESTEDOPT 
(aggregated delta of already-vested options × stock price, both at the end of year t-
1). Delta is calculated similarly as above; 
Equity sold  
EQUITYSOLDq The number of shares sold in quarter q × stock price at the end of quarter q-1;  
Change in investment 
ΔRDq Change in R&D expenditure (XRDQ) from quarter q-1 to q, scaled by total assets 
(ATQ) at the end of quarter q-1. Missing R&D expenditure is set to zero; 
ΔCAPEXq Change in capital expenditure (inferred from CAPXY) from quarter q-1 to q, scaled 
by total assets at the end of quarter q-1. Missing capital expenditure is set to zero; 
ΔNETINVq Change in net capital expenditure from quarter q-1 to q, calculated as (PPENTQq - 
PPENTQq-1) - (PPENTQq-1 - PPENTQq-2), scaled by total assets at the end of quarter 
q-1. Missing net capital expenditure is set to zero; 
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ΔRDCAPEXq Change in the sum of R&D expenditure and capital expenditure from quarter q-1 
to q, scaled by total assets at the end of quarter q-1. Missing R&D expenditure and 
capital expenditure are set to zero; 
ΔRDNETINVq Change in the sum of R&D expenditure and net capital expenditure from quarter q-
1 to q, scaled by total assets at the end of quarter q-1. Missing R&D expenditure 
and net capital expenditure are set to zero; 
Control variables  
SALARYq-1 CEO’s salary in year t-1; 
BONUSq-1  CEO’s cash bonus in year t-1; 
CEOAGEq-1 CEO’s age in year t-1; 
CEOTENUREq-1  CEO’s tenure in year t-1; 
NEWCEOq  An indicator variable to denote new CEO in year t to which quarter q belongs; 
FIRMAGEq-1  Firm’s age in year t-1, approximated by the number of years listed on Compustat; 
Qq Tobin’s Q at the end of quarter q, calculated as [market value of equity 
(PRCCQ×CSHPRQ) plus liquidating value of preferred stock (PSTKQ) plus book 
value of debt (DLTTQ+DLCQ) minus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit (TXDITCQ)] divided by total assets at the end of quarter q-1.  
Qq-1 Tobin’s Q at the end of quarter q-1; 
MVq-1  Natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of quarter q-1;  
MOMq-1  Compounded market-adjusted monthly stock returns over the three months in 
quarter q-1, with market-adjusted monthly stock return calculated as the firm’s 
monthly raw stock return minus the corresponding monthly return on the CRSP 
value-weighted index;  
CASHq-1  Cash and short-term investments (CHEQ) at the end of quarter q-1 divided by total 
assets at the end of quarter q-1; 
BOOKLEVq-1  Book value of debt at the end of quarter q-1 divided by total assets at the end of 
quarter q-1; 
RETEARNq-1  Balance sheet retained earnings (REQ) at the end of quarter q-1 divided by total 
assets at the end of quarter q-1; 
ROAq-1  Return-on-assets ratio, calculated as net income (NIQ) during quarter q-1 divided 
by the average total assets of quarter q-1; 
Operating performance measures 
SGRq Sales growth, calculated as sales (SALEQ) in quarter q divided by sales in quarter 
q-4 minus one; 
ΔCOGSq Change in cost of goods sold-to-sales ratio (COGSQ/SALEQ) from quarter q-1 to 
q; 
ΔOPEXPq Change in operating expenses-to-sales ratio (XOPRQ/SALEQ) from quarter q-1 to 
q; 
Cross-sectional variables 
IOq-1 The total percentage of shares owned by institutional investors at the end of quarter 
q-1; 
BLOCKOq-1 The total percentage of shares owned by blockholders, defined as those who hold 
1% or more, at the end of quarter q-1; 
NBLOCKq-1 The number of blockholders, defined as those who hold 1% or more, measured at 
the end of quarter q-1; 
Additional variables used in the analyst revision analysis  
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ALYREVq  The latest mean analyst consensus forecast prior to the end of quarter q minus the 
latest mean analyst consensus forecast prior to the end of quarter q-1, scaled by the 
stock price at the end of quarter q-1; 
ALYREV2q The latest mean analyst consensus forecast prior to the last equity sales in quarter q 
minus the latest mean analyst consensus forecast prior to the end of quarter q-1, 
scaled by the stock price at the end of quarter q-1; 
ALYREV3q The latest mean analyst consensus forecast prior to the last equity sales in quarter q 
(or prior to the end of quarter q if there is no equity sale in the quarter) minus the 
latest mean analyst consensus forecast prior to the end of quarter q-1, scaled by the 
stock price at the end of quarter q-1; 
ANALYSTq The number of analysts following the firm in quarter q; 
ANDISPq Analyst forecast dispersion, calculated as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts 
scaled by the absolute value of the mean analyst consensus forecast; 
HORIZONq The mean average forecasting horizon, with forecasting horizon being the number 
of days between an analyst forecast date and earnings announcement date; 
Additional variables used in the earnings guidance analysis  
POSNEUEGq The instances of positive and neutral management earnings guidance issued in 
quarter q. Positive guidance events include those coded by I/B/E/S as “Beat 
Consensus,” “Match Consensus,” or “Positive Sales Comparison.” Neutral 
guidance events include those coded as “Announce Charge” (i.e., announcing the 
inclusion or exclusion of a charge), “Announce Gain” (i.e., announcing the 
inclusion or exclusion of a gain), or “Management Guidance;”  
POSEGq The instances of positive management earnings guidance issued in quarter q. 
Positive guidance events are as defined above; 
NEGEGq The instances of negative management earnings guidance issued in quarter q. 
Negative guidance events include those coded by I/B/E/S as “Earnings Shortfall,” 
“Negative Sale Comparison,” or “Restatement;” 
EGq The total instances of management earnings guidance issued in quarter q; 
EQUITYSOLD%q The percentage of equity sold in quarter q within window [0, x], with day 0 being 
the announcement date of a positive earnings guidance event as tracked in I/B/E/S 
and x being the 2nd, 5th, 10th, 15th, and 20th trading day after the event; 
Additional variables used in the earnings surprise analysis  
BEATq An indicator variable that equals one if the reported EPS is more than or equal to 
the latest mean analyst consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement of 
quarter q and zero otherwise; 
BEATBELOW1q An indicator variable that equals one if the reported EPS falls between the latest 
mean analyst consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement of quarter q 
and that plus one cent in a given quarter;  
BEATABOVE1q An indicator variable that equals one if the reported EPS exceeds the latest mean 
analyst consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement of quarter q plus one 
cent in a given quarter. 
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Appendix B: A numerical example 
This appendix illustrates the calculation steps to derive equity incentives for a sample CEO, along 
with the company’s disclosure tables retrieved from Equilar for the two fiscal years on which the 
calculations are based. As an example, we use James McCann, CEO of 1-800 Flowers.com, Inc. 
and calculate the price sensitivity of his vesting equity for the four quarters of the fiscal year ending 
on June 30th, 2009 (VESTING), his unvested equity for the fiscal year ending on June 30th, 2008 
(UNVESTED), and his vested equity for the fiscal year ending on June 30th, 2008 (VESTED). 
VESTING for Q1-Q4 of the fiscal year ended on June 30th, 2009 
 
We calculate VESTING in two steps. First, we obtain option data from Equilar for James McCann: 
 
B.1 Outstanding options as reported in Equilar 
 Equity Type Number of Securities Strike price Expiry date 
 As of June 30th, 2009 
(1) Unexercisable Options 10,000 $ 8.45 12/2/14 
(2) Unexercisable Options 20,000 $ 6.52 10/13/15 
(3) Unexercisable Options 224,109 $ 3.11 5/5/16 
(4) Exercisable Options 39,810 $ 12.44 12/17/09 
(5) Exercisable Options 82,730 $ 11.58 8/2/11 
(6) Exercisable Options 200,000 $ 12.87 1/11/12 
(7) Exercisable Options 200,000 $ 6.42 9/23/12 
(8) Exercisable Options 170,148 $ 6.70 3/24/13 
(9) Exercisable Options 29,852 $ 6.70 3/24/13 
(10) Exercisable Options 40,000 $ 8.45 12/2/14 
(11) Exercisable Options 30,000 $ 6.52 10/13/15 
 As of June 30th, 2008 
(12) Unexercisable Options 20,000 $ 8.45 12/2/14 
(13) Unexercisable Options 30,000 $ 6.52 10/13/15 
(14) Exercisable Options 39,810 $ 12.44 12/17/09 
(15) Exercisable Options 82,730 $ 11.58 8/2/11 
(16) Exercisable Options 200,000 $ 12.87 1/11/12 
(17) Exercisable Options 200,000 $ 6.42 9/23/12 
(18) Exercisable Options 170,148 $ 6.70 3/24/13 
(19) Exercisable Options 29,852 $ 6.70 3/24/13 
(20) Exercisable Options 30,000 $ 8.45 12/2/14 
(21) Exercisable Options 20,000 $ 6.52 10/13/15 
 
B.2 Newly granted options as reported in Equilar 
 Grant Date Number of Securities Strike price Expiry date 
(22) 5/5/09  224,109   $ 3.11  5/5/16 
 
To calculate the number of vesting options for fiscal year 2009, we match and group the 
outstanding options by strike price and expiry date. We then infer the number of vesting options 
from the following relationship, for a given price-date pair: 
 
VESTINGOPTNUMq = UNVESTEDOPTNUMq-1 + NEWOPTNUMq - UNVESTEDOPTNUMq 
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After identifying vesting options in fiscal year 2009 at the grant level (show in Table B.3 below), we 
assign them to the four quarters of the year based on the grants’ expiry dates. The 10,000 options 
vesting from the grant expiring on December 2nd, 2014 and the 10,000 options vesting from the grant 
expiring on October 13th, 2015 are both assigned to Q2 of fiscal year 2009 (which runs from October 
1st, 2008 to December 31st, 2008). We then input into the Black-Scholes formula the risk-free rate, 
volatility, and dividend yield from Equilar and calculate each option’s delta, grant-by-grant. 
 
B.3 Calculated number and delta of vesting options as of June 30th, 2009 
Calculated number 
of vesting options 
Number of 
Securities 
Strike 
price 
Expiry 
date 
Term as of prior 
quarter end Z Delta 
(12) - (1) 10,000 $ 8.45 12/2/14 6.17 0.803 7,891 
(13) - (2) 10,000 $ 6.52 10/13/15 7.04 1.017 8,455 
(22) - (3) 0  $ 3.11  5/5/16      
      ∑Delta=16,345.46 
 
To calculate the price-sensitivity measures of vesting options, we multiply the deltas calculated above 
by the closing stock price of $6.02 at the end of Q1 of fiscal year 2009. James McCann’s 
VESTINGOPT for the four quarters of fiscal year 2009 is therefore calculated as 16,345.46 × 6.02 = 
98,399.67 for Q2, and 0 for Q1, Q3, and Q4. 
 
Second, we obtain share data from Equilar for James McCann: 
 
B.4 Shares held as reported in Equilar 
Shares 
Acquired on 
Vesting of 
Stock  
for the year 
ended on 
June 30th 
2009 
(a) 
Total 
Unvested 
Shares  
for the year 
ended on 
June 30th 
2008 
(b) 
Total 
Unvested IP 
Shares 
for the year 
ended on 
June 30th 
2008 
(c) 
Unvested 
Shares for 
the year 
ended on 
June 30th 
2008 
= (b) + (c)  
Shares Held  
for the year 
ended on 
June 30th 
2008 
(d) 
Options 
Exercisable 
Within 60 
Days of 
Proxy Date  
for the year 
ended on 
June 30th 
2008 
(e) 
Already-
vested Shares  
for the year 
ended on 
June 30th 
2008 
= (d) – (e) 
67,434 33,000 277,677 310,677 36,775,359 792,540 35,982,819 
 
B.5 Newly granted shares as reported in Equilar 
 
Grant Date 
Number of 
Securities 
Vesting 
Schedule 
Vesting 
Period Performance? 
(23) 10/27/08 37,500   Cliff  3 N/A 
(24) 5/5/09  112,055   Graded  3 N/A 
 
The total number of vesting shares in fiscal year 2009 is 67,434. Since neither of the grants awarded 
post 2006 vests in fiscal year 2009 (the first grant vests on October 27th, 2011, and the second grants 
vests annually starting May 5th, 2010), we allocate 67,434 evenly between Q2 (based on grant date of 
October 27th) and Q4 (based on grant date of May 5th) of fiscal year 2009. James McCann’s 
VESTINGSTOCK for the four quarters of fiscal year 2009 is therefore calculated as 33,717 × 6.02 
(the closing stock price at the end of Q1) = 202,976.34 for Q2, 33,717 × $2.07 (the closing stock price 
at the end of Q3) = 69,794.19 for Q4, and 0 for Q1 and Q3. 
 
Finally, we sum the sensitivity measures of options and shares to construct the quarterly VESTING 
used in the main specification, shown below as:  
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B.6 Quarterly VESTING in fiscal year 2009 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
0 301,376.01 0 69,794.19 
 
UNVESTED for the fiscal year ended on June 30th, 2008 
 
We similarly calculate the price sensitivity of James McCann’s unvested equity for the fiscal year 
ended on June 30th, 2008 (net of his vesting equity in fiscal year 2009), UNVESTED. We first calculate 
the aggregate delta of his unvested options shown below as: 
 
B.7 Calculated number and delta of unvested options as of June 30th, 2008 
Calculated number of 
unvested options 
Number of 
Securities Strike price Expiry date 
Term as of 
6/30/08 Z Delta 
(12) 20,000 $ 8.45 12/2/14 6.4275 0.865 16,128 
(13) 30,000 $ 6.52 10/13/15 7.2904 1.072 25,746 
      ∑Delta=41,874 
 
We then multiply the aggregated delta by the closing stock price of $6.45 at the end of fiscal year 
2008. James McCann’s UNVESTEDOPT at the end of fiscal year 2008 is therefore calculated as 
41,874 × 6.45 = 270,087.3. His UNVESTEDSTOCK at the end of fiscal year 2008 is calculated as 
310,677 (from Table B.4) × 6.45 = 2,003,866.65. Finally, we calculate UNVESTED = max 
(UNVESTEDOPT – VESTINGOPT, 0) + max (UNVESTEDSTOCK – VESTINGSTOCK, 0) = max 
(270,087.3 – 107,366.7, 0) + max (2,003,866.65 – 434,949.3, 0) = 1,731,637.95. Note that, 
VESTINGOPT at the annual level is calculated using the term and price as of June 30th, 2008 to be 
consistent with UNVESTEDOPT. VESTINGSTOCK at the annual level is also calculated using the 
price as of June 30th, 2008 to be consistent with UNVESTEDSTOCK.  
 
VESTED for the fiscal year ended on June 30th, 2008 
 
To calculate the price sensitivity of James McCann’s vested equity for the fiscal year ended on June 
30th, 2008, VESTED, we first calculate the aggregate delta of his vested options shown below as: 
 
B.8 Calculated number and delta of vested options as of June 30th, 2008 
Calculated number of 
vested options 
Number of 
Securities 
Strike 
price Expiry date 
Term as of 
6/30/08 Z Delta 
(14) 39,810 $ 12.44 12/17/09 1.4659 -0.266 15,724 
(15) 82,730 $ 11.58 8/2/11 3.0904 0.242 49,266 
(16) 200,000 $ 12.87 1/11/12 3.5344 0.243 119,174 
(17) 200,000 $ 6.42 9/23/12 4.2356 0.825 159,041 
(18)+(19) 200,000 $ 6.70 3/24/13 4.7342 0.844 160,152 
(20) 30,000 $ 8.45 12/2/14 6.4275 0.865 24,192 
(21) 20,000 $ 6.52 10/13/15 7.2904 1.072 17,164 
      ∑Delta=544,714 
 
We then multiply the aggregated delta by the closing stock price of $6.45 at the end of fiscal year 
2008. James McCann’s VESTEDOPT at the end of fiscal year 2008 is therefore calculated as 544,714 
× 6.45 = 3,513,405.3. His VESTEDSTOCK at the end of fiscal year 2008 is calculated as 35,982,819 
(from Table B.4) × 6.45 = 232,089,182.55. James McCann’s VESTED for the fiscal year ended on 
June 30th, 2008 is therefore 235,602,587, the sum of his VESTEDOPT and VESTEDSTOCK. 
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Table 1: Sample selection and summary statistics 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Firm-CEO-years in Equilar for which we can calculate the price sensitivity of vesting 
equity of quarter q, and that of unvested and already-vested equity in year t-1 for the 
sample period of fiscal year 2007 to 2010 9,385 
(-) Observations that cannot be matched to Compustat or CRSP  (320) 
(-) Observations associated with financial firms (SICs between 6000 and 6999)  (2,010) 
(-) Observations associated with utility firms (SICs between 4900 and 4949)  (325) 
Number of Firm-CEO-years  6,730 
Converting Firm-CEO-years to Firm-CEO-quarters  26,920 
(-) Observations missing quarterly controls (196) 
Number of Firm-CEO-quarters in the final sample 26,724 
Number of unique firms in the final sample 2,043 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Table 1 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Summary statistics 
Variable N 5% Mean Median 95% SD 
Dependent variables of the main specification: change in investment 
ΔRDq 26,724 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.007 
ΔCAPEXq 26,724 -0.013 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.010 
ΔNETINVq 26,724 -0.026 0.001 0.000 0.029 0.025 
ΔRDCAPEXq 26,724 -0.020 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.014 
ΔRDNETINVq 26,724 -0.032 0.001 0.000 0.035 0.029 
Key independent variables of the main specification: CEO incentives from vesting equity 
VESTINGq 26,724 0 785,139 0 4,457,005 2,321,968 
VESTINGSTOCKq 26,724 0 177,891 0 1,104,233 646,830 
VESTINGOPTq 26,724 0 566,498 0 3,359,160 1,863,655 
Other independent variables of the main specification: annual controls 
UNVESTEDq-1 6,730 0 5,656,486 1,835,151 25,000,000 10,200,000 
VESTEDq-1 6,730 415,985 70,400,000 13,300,000 298,000,000 205,000,000 
SALARYq-1 6,730 265,000 670,194 600,000 1,300,000 336,489 
BONUSq-1 6,730 0 167,704 0 979,620 483,780 
CEOAGEq-1 6,730 42 54 54 67 8 
CEOTENUREq-1 6,730 0 7 5 22 7 
NEWCEOq 6,730 0 0.004 0 0 0.064 
FIRMAGEq-1 6,730 4 21 15 57 16 
Other independent variables of the main specification: quarterly controls 
Qq 26,724 0.525 1.687 1.260 4.454 1.332 
Qq-1 26,724 0.527 1.711 1.282 4.523 1.352 
MVq-1 26,724 4.626 6.931 6.732 9.924 1.597 
MOMq-1  26,724 -0.312 0.029 0.007 0.448 0.237 
CASHq-1  26,724 0.006 0.199 0.116 0.681 0.217 
BOOKLEVq-1  26,724 0.000 0.215 0.174 0.640 0.215 
RETEARNq-1 26,724 -2.557 -0.200 0.162 0.726 1.404 
ROAq-1  26,724 -0.102 0.001 0.012 0.051 0.052 
Endogenous variable of interest: equity sold 
EQUITYSOLDq 26,724 0 874,992 0 4,960,305 3,030,349 
Other operating performance measures 
SGRq 26,385  -1.371 -0.879 -0.933 -0.263 0.424 
ΔCOGSq 26,325  -0.093 -0.004 0.000 0.083 0.272 
ΔOPEXPq 26,322 -0.169 -0.005 -0.002 0.147 0.376 
Summary statistics of the main variables used in our multivariate analysis. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
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Table 2: Vesting equity and change in investment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables ΔRDq ΔCAPEXq ΔNETINVq ΔRDCAPEXq ΔRDNETINVq 
VESTINGq -0.060*** -0.089*** -0.149** -0.159*** -0.224*** 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.067) (0.039) (0.079) 
UNVESTEDq-1 -0.003 0.004 0.051 0.002 0.054 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.036) (0.018) (0.040) 
VESTEDq-1 -0.001* 0.002 -0.006 0.001 -0.008* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
SALARYq-1 -0.341 -0.274 4.200 -0.662 3.952 
 (0.618) (0.996) (2.765) (1.387) (3.040) 
BONUSq-1  -0.047 -0.189 -0.334 -0.281 -0.433 
 (0.142) (0.240) (0.628) (0.338) (0.688) 
CEOAGEq-1 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.011 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) 
CEOTENUREq-1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) 
NEWCEOq 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
FIRMAGEq-1 0.020 0.588*** 0.013 0.669** -0.005 
 (0.079) (0.226) (0.740) (0.299) (0.787) 
Qq  0.000* 0.000 0.004*** 0.001** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Qq-1  0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
MVq-1 -0.001*** 0.000* -0.004*** -0.000 -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
MOMq-1 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CASHq-1 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.041*** 0.016*** 0.048*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
BOOKLEVq-1 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.021*** -0.008*** -0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
RETEARNq-1 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
ROAq-1 0.014*** 0.010*** -0.056*** 0.027*** -0.036*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) 
Intercept -0.004 -0.121*** 0.013 -0.137** 0.017 
 (0.015) (0.044) (0.144) (0.058) (0.153) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,724 26,724 26,724 26,724 26,724 
Adjusted R2  0.093 0.066 0.053 0.099 0.058 
OLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and the change in investment. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. VESTING, UNVESTED, VESTED, SALARY, and BONUS are in 
billions. CEOAGE, CEOTENURE, and FIRMAGE are in hundreds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Time-based vesting vs. performance-based vesting 
 
Panel A: Deleting performance-based vesting equity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables ΔRDq ΔCAPEXq ΔNETINVq ΔRDCAPEXq ΔRDNETINVq 
VESTING_TBq -0.132*** -0.135*** -0.371*** -0.304*** -0.569*** 
 (0.044) (0.052) (0.136) (0.081) (0.160) 
UNVESTEDq-1 -0.004 0.003 0.051 0.001 0.053 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.036) (0.017) (0.040) 
VESTEDq-1 -0.001* 0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.008* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
SALARYq-1 -0.338 -0.286 4.219 -0.667 3.983 
 (0.618) (0.996) (2.764) (1.387) (3.039) 
BONUSq-1  -0.040 -0.179 -0.315 -0.263 -0.405 
 (0.143) (0.240) (0.628) (0.338) (0.688) 
CEOAGEq-1 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.011 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) 
CEOTENUREq-1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) 
NEWCEOq 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
FIRMAGEq-1 0.019 0.587*** 0.009 0.666** -0.010 
 (0.079) (0.226) (0.740) (0.299) (0.788) 
Qq  0.000* 0.000 0.004*** 0.001** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Qq-1  0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
MVq-1 -0.001*** 0.000* -0.004*** -0.000 -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
MOMq-1 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CASHq-1 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.041*** 0.016*** 0.048*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
BOOKLEVq-1 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.021*** -0.008*** -0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
RETEARNq-1 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
ROAq-1 0.014*** 0.010*** -0.056*** 0.027*** -0.036*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) 
Intercept -0.004 -0.121*** 0.014 -0.136** 0.018 
 (0.015) (0.044) (0.144) (0.058) (0.153) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,724 26,724 26,724 26,724 26,724 
Adjusted R2  0.093 0.066 0.053 0.099 0.058 
OLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and the change in investment. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. VESTING_TB includes only post-2006 time-based vesting grants. 
VESTING_TB, UNVESTED, VESTED, SALARY, and BONUS are in billions. CEOAGE, CEOTENURE, and 
FIRMAGE are in hundreds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 
1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
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Table 3 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Separating VESTING into VESTINGSTOCK and VESTINGOPT 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables ΔRDq ΔCAPEXq ΔNETINVq ΔRDCAPEXq ΔRDNETINVq 
VESTINGSTOCKq -0.129** -0.217* -0.448 -0.030 -0.219 
 (0.065) (0.112) (0.282) (0.145) (0.307) 
VESTINGOPTq -0.102*** -0.079** -0.097 -0.210*** -0.240** 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.085) (0.050) (0.102) 
UNVESTEDq-1 -0.003 0.004 0.051 0.002 0.054 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.036) (0.018) (0.040) 
VESTEDq-1 -0.001* 0.002 -0.006 0.001 -0.008* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
SALARYq-1 -0.343 -0.271 4.198 -0.659 3.949 
 (0.618) (0.996) (2.766) (1.387) (3.042) 
BONUSq-1  -0.043 -0.188 -0.332 -0.275 -0.426 
 (0.142) (0.240) (0.628) (0.338) (0.688) 
CEOAGEq-1 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.010 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) 
CEOTENUREq-1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) 
NEWCEOq 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
FIRMAGEq-1 0.016 0.588*** 0.014 0.664** -0.009 
 (0.079) (0.226) (0.740) (0.299) (0.788) 
Qq  0.000* 0.000 0.004*** 0.001** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Qq-1  0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
MVq-1 -0.001*** 0.000** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
MOMq-1 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CASHq-1 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.041*** 0.016*** 0.048*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
BOOKLEVq-1 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.021*** -0.008*** -0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
RETEARNq-1 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
ROAq-1 0.014*** 0.010*** -0.056*** 0.027*** -0.036*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) 
Intercept -0.003 -0.121*** 0.013 -0.135** 0.018 
 (0.015) (0.044) (0.144) (0.058) (0.153) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,724 26,724 26,724 26,724 26,724 
Adjusted R2  0.093 0.066 0.053 0.099 0.058 
OLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and the change in investment. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. VESTING, VESTINGSTOCK, VESTINGOPT, UNVESTED, VESTED, 
SALARY, and BONUS are in billions. CEOAGE, CEOTENURE, and FIRMAGE are in hundreds. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Equity sales and change in investment: 2SLS analysis 
 
 (1) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) 
Dependent Variables EQUITY_SOLDq ΔRDq ΔCAPEXq ΔNETINVq ΔRDCAPEXq ΔRDNETINVq 
VESTINGq 0.059***      
 (0.008)      
FIT_ EQUITYSOLDq  -1.032** -1.511*** -2.546** -2.718*** -3.826** 
  (0.448) (0.576) (1.284) (0.950) (1.622) 
UNVESTEDq-1 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 0.040 -0.010 0.037 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.017) (0.040) (0.025) (0.048) 
VESTEDq-1 0.003*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.001 0.008** 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
SALARYq-1 0.846*** 0.532 1.005 6.355** 1.638 7.191** 
 (0.260) (0.846) (1.250) (3.106) (1.928) (3.646) 
BONUSq-1  -0.090 -0.139 -0.324 -0.562 -0.525 -0.776 
 (0.060) (0.171) (0.277) (0.668) (0.418) (0.768) 
CEOAGEq-1 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.013 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) 
CEOTENUREq-1 0.005*** 0.005 0.007 0.013 0.013 0.014 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.015) 
NEWCEOq  0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
FIRMAGEq-1 0.050 0.072 0.665*** 0.141 0.806** 0.188 
 (0.039) (0.094) (0.236) (0.747) (0.323) (0.802) 
Qq  0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Qq-1  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
MVq-1 0.000*** -0.000 0.001*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
MOMq-1 0.000* 0.000* 0.002*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CASHq-1 0.000 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.042*** 0.017*** 0.050*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
BOOKLEVq-1 0.000 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.020*** -0.008*** -0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
RETEARNq-1 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
ROAq-1 0.001** 0.015*** 0.011*** -0.054*** 0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) 
Intercept -0.030 -0.005** -0.007 0.003 -0.012 -0.004 
 (0.022) (0.002) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,724 26,724   26,724 26,724 26,724  26,724 
Adjusted R2 (R2)      0.246 0.093    0.066   0.053     0.099      0.057 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic: 53.03. Stock-Yogo (2005) critical value for 10% maximal IV size: 16.38. 
2SLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s equity sales and the change in investment, using 
VESTING as an instrument for EQUITYSOLD. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. Column (1) presents 
the first-stage results associated with column (2.1), and columns (2.1)-(2.5) present the second-stage results 
for the five different investment measures. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. FIT_EQUITYSOLD is the 
fitted value of EQUITYSOLD from the first-stage regressions. EQUITYSOLD, VESTING, UNVESTED, 
VESTED, SALARY, and BONUS are in billions. CEOAGE, CEOTENURE, and FIRMAGE are in hundreds. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed 
level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Keeping grants made at least two years ago 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables ΔRDq ΔCAPEXq ΔNETINVq ΔRDCAPEXq ΔRDNETINVq 
VESTING>2Yq -1.379** -0.309*** -0.454* -0.430*** -0.596** 
 (0.700) (0.090) (0.239) (0.130) (0.264) 
UNVESTEDq-1 -0.005 0.002 0.048 -0.001 0.050 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.036) (0.018) (0.040) 
VESTEDq-1 -0.001* 0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.008* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
SALARYq-1 -0.364 -0.222 4.266 -0.609 4.023 
 (0.619) (0.996) (2.766) (1.386) (3.040) 
BONUSq-1  -0.043 -0.198 -0.345 -0.291 -0.446 
 (0.143) (0.240) (0.628) (0.339) (0.688) 
CEOAGEq-1 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.011 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) 
CEOTENUREq-1 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) 
NEWCEOt  0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
FIRMAGEq-1 0.021 0.586*** 0.009 0.666** -0.009 
 (0.079) (0.226) (0.740) (0.299) (0.788) 
Qq  0.000* 0.000 0.004*** 0.001** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Qq-1  0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
MVq-1 -0.001*** 0.000** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
MOMq-1 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CASHq-1 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.041*** 0.016*** 0.048*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
BOOKLEVq-1 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.021*** -0.008*** -0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
RETEARNq-1 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
ROAq-1 0.014*** 0.010*** -0.056*** 0.027*** -0.036*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) 
Intercept -0.004 -0.121*** 0.014 -0.136** 0.017 
 (0.015) (0.044) (0.144) (0.058) (0.153) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,724 26,724 26,724 26,724 26,724 
Adjusted R2  0.093 0.066 0.053 0.099 0.058 
OLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and the change in investment. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. VESTING>2Y includes only post-2006 grants that are awarded at least 
two years prior to the end of quarter q. VESTING>2Y, UNVESTED, VESTED, SALARY, and BONUS are in 
billions. CEOAGE, CEOTENURE, and FIRMAGE are in hundreds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Vesting equity and change in operating performance measures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables SGRq  ΔCOGSq ΔOPEXPq 
VESTINGq 0.017 0.056 0.062 
 (0.030) (0.065) (0.068) 
UNVESTEDq-1 -0.005 -0.046 -0.056 
 (0.007) (0.037) (0.040) 
VESTEDq-1 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SALARYq-1 -0.724** 0.055 0.350 
 (0.335) (0.542) (0.646) 
BONUSq-1  0.014 -0.254 -0.270 
 (0.096) (0.176) (0.179) 
CEOAGEq-1 0.013 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) 
CEOTENUREq-1 0.004 -0.011 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.039) 
NEWCEOq 0.120 -0.503 -1.176 
 (0.404) (0.386) (0.803) 
FIRMAGEq-1 0.506 0.176 0.688 
 (0.669) (2.827) (3.251) 
Qq  0.175 -0.425 -1.482 
 (0.188) (2.776) (3.109) 
Qq-1  0.264 -0.505 -0.175 
 (0.447) (0.667) (0.750) 
MVq-1 -0.218 -1.686 -2.860 
 (0.513) (2.574) (3.056) 
MOMq-1 1.274 0.315 0.893 
 (0.902) (0.362) (0.939) 
CASHq-1 -3.995 -1.835 -2.023 
 (3.549) (3.461) (3.792) 
BOOKLEVq-1 -3.510 4.782 0.227 
 (4.268) (4.159) (5.158) 
RETEARNq-1 0.730 -1.074 -5.262 
 (0.935) (1.599) (3.280) 
ROAq-1 -2.934 30.935** 28.012* 
 (4.789) (12.100) (15.567) 
Intercept -27.534 -2.095 -14.545 
 (18.451) (9.329) (19.864) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,385 26,325 26,322 
Adjusted R2  0.234 0.023 0.039 
OLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and the change in operating 
performance. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. VESTING, UNVESTED, VESTED, SALARY, and 
BONUS are in millions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% 
(5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Vesting equity and change in investment: Sample splits  
Panel A: Sorting on raw values 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables ΔRDCAPEXq ΔRDNETINVq 
 Low IO High IO Low IO High IO 
VESTINGq -0.268*** -0.077 -0.437*** -0.069 
 (0.067) (0.071) (0.136) (0.123) 
p-value of the χ2 test 0.01*** 0.02** 
Observations 13,362 13,362 13,362 13,362 
Adjusted R2  0.122 0.128 0.090 0.078 
 Low BLOCKO High BLOCKO Low BLOCKO High BLOCKO 
VESTINGq -0.229*** -0.063 -0.367*** -0.027 
 (0.053) (0.082) (0.109) (0.151) 
p-value of the χ2 test 0.03** 0.03** 
Observations 13,362 13,362 13,362 13,362 
Adjusted R2  0.125 0.126 0.091 0.092 
 Low NBLOCK High NBLOCK Low NBLOCK High NBLOCK 
VESTINGq -0.322*** -0.038 -0.465*** -0.024 
 (0.069) (0.058) (0.133) (0.119) 
p-value of the χ2 test <0.01*** <0.01*** 
Observations 13,095 13,629 13,095 13,629 
Adjusted R2  0.132 0.141 0.094 0.094 
 Low CEOAGE High CEOAGE Low CEOAGE High CEOAGE 
VESTINGq -0.101 -0.196*** -0.006 -0.397*** 
 (0.089) (0.047) (0.146) (0.107) 
p-value of the χ2 test 0.21 0.01*** 
Observations 13,270 13,454 13,270 13,454 
Adjusted R2  0.104 0.114 0.066 0.065 
 Low MV High MV Low MV High MV 
VESTINGq -0.165 -0.135*** -0.045 -0.173** 
 (0.199) (0.040) (0.385) (0.084) 
p-value of the χ2 test 0.87 0.38 
Observations 13,362 13,362 13,362 13,362 
Adjusted R2  0.097 0.146 0.073 0.087 
 Low FIRMAGE High FIRMAGE Low FIRMAGE High FIRMAGE 
VESTINGq -0.125 -0.145*** -0.032 -0.309*** 
 (0.102) (0.045) (0.160) (0.098) 
p-value of the χ2 test 0.81 0.09* 
Observations 12,578 14,146 12,578 14,146 
Adjusted R2  0.093 0.122 0.064 0.061 
Controls (all panels) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Quarter, and Firm FE (all panels) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and the change in investment in 
subsamples split based on institutional ownership, block ownership, number of blockholders, CEO age, firm 
size, and firm age. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. VESTING is in billions. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. The coefficients on VESTING across subsamples are compared using a chi-squared test. *** (**) 
(*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
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Table 7 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Sorting on the residual values after orthogonalizing with respect to MV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables ΔRDCAPEXq ΔRDNETINVq 
 Low IO High IO Low IO High IO 
VESTINGq -0.244*** -0.038 -0.341*** -0.048 
 (0.055) (0.074) (0.109) (0.148) 
p-value of the χ2 test <0.01*** 0.06* 
Observations 13,362 13,362 13,362 13,362 
Adjusted R2  0.122 0.118 0.088 0.085 
 Low BLOCKO High BLOCKO Low BLOCKO High BLOCKO 
VESTINGq -0.235*** -0.033 -0.371*** 0.005 
 (0.053) (0.080) (0.106) (0.153) 
p-value of the χ2 test <0.01*** 0.02** 
Observations 13,362 13,362 13,362 13,362 
Adjusted R2  0.126 0.127 0.090 0.093 
 Low NBLOCK High NBLOCK Low NBLOCK High NBLOCK 
VESTINGq -0.240*** -0.027 -0.364*** -0.070 
 (0.055) (0.065) (0.114) (0.132) 
p-value of the χ2 test <0.01*** 0.05** 
Observations 13,362 13,362 13,362 13,362 
Adjusted R2  0.137 0.137 0.092 0.097 
 Low CEOAGE High CEOAGE Low CEOAGE High CEOAGE 
VESTINGq -0.153* -0.166*** -0.106 -0.351*** 
 (0.091) (0.047) (0.144) (0.111) 
p-value of the χ2 test 0.86 0.1* 
Observations 13,362 13,362 13,362 13,362 
Adjusted R2  0.111 0.109 0.070 0.064 
 Low FIRMAGE High FIRMAGE Low FIRMAGE High FIRMAGE 
VESTINGq -0.048 -0.277*** 0.032 -0.506*** 
 (0.072) (0.055) (0.146) (0.103) 
p-value of the χ2 test <0.01*** <0.01*** 
Observations 13,362 13,362 13,362 13,362 
Adjusted R2  0.101 0.136 0.067 0.089 
Controls (all panels) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Quarter, and Firm FE (all panels) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and the change in investment in 
subsamples split based on the residuals from orthogonalizing institutional ownership, block ownership, number 
of blockholders, CEO age, and firm age with respect to firm size. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
VESTING is in billions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficients on VESTING across 
subsamples are compared using a chi-squared test. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-
tailed level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Myopia vs. efficiency: Dynamic analysis 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables ΔRDq ΔCAPEXq ΔNETINVq ΔRDCAPEXq ΔRDNETINVq 
VESTINGq-1 -0.036** -0.008 0.023 -0.048 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.067) (0.035) (0.074) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Quarter, and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,719 26,719 26,719 26,719 26,719 
Adjusted R2  0.087 0.049 0.026 0.081 0.032 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables ΔRDq ΔCAPEXq ΔNETINVq ΔRDCAPEXq ΔRDNETINVq 
VESTINGq-2 -0.001 0.038 0.177** 0.033 0.170** 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.074) (0.034) (0.082) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Quarter, and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,701 26,701 26,701 26,701 26,701 
Adjusted R2  0.087 0.059 0.029 0.087 0.034 
Panel C (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables ΔRDq ΔCAPEXq ΔNETINVq ΔRDCAPEXq ΔRDNETINVq 
VESTINGq-3 0.062*** 0.044* -0.036 0.111*** 0.019 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.075) (0.037) (0.085) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Quarter, and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,667 26,667 26,667 26,667 26,667 
Adjusted R2  0.094 0.064 0.027 0.094 0.034 
OLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and the change in investment in 
future quarters. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. VESTING is in billions. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Analyst forecast revisions  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables ALYREVq ALYREV2q ALYREV3q 
VESTINGq 0.039** 0.049** 0.035** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) 
UNVESTEDq-1 -0.016 -0.024* -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
VESTEDq-1 -0.003** -0.003 -0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
SALARYq-1 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
BONUSq-1  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEOAGEq-1 0.002 0.005 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
CEOTENUREq-1 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
NEWCEOq 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
MVq-1 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Qq-1  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROAq-1 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.039*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
IOq-1 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ANALYSTq -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ANDISPq -0.000 -0.001** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HORIZONq 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept -0.039*** -0.046*** -0.036*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,745 5,894 12,673 
Adjusted R2  0.343 0.480 0.348 
OLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and analyst forecast revisions. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. VESTING, UNVESTED, and VESTED are in billions. SALARY and 
BONUS are in millions. CEOAGE and CEOTENURE are in hundreds. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
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Table 10: Vesting equity and frequency of earnings guidance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables POSNEUEGq POSEGq NEGEGq EGq 
VESTINGq 0.161** 0.142* -0.032 0.129 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.050) (0.086) 
UNVESTEDq-1 0.039 0.029 0.017 0.056* 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.019) (0.033) 
VESTEDq-1 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
SALARYq-1 -4.797** -3.616 5.588*** 0.791 
 (2.439) (2.388) (1.553) (2.700) 
BONUSq-1  0.417 0.376 -0.117 0.300 
 (0.509) (0.499) (0.324) (0.564) 
CEOAGEq-1 1.052 0.979 -0.977 0.075 
 (0.999) (0.978) (0.636) (1.105) 
CEOTENUREq-1 2.231* 2.396** 0.088 2.320* 
 (1.178) (1.153) (0.750) (1.304) 
NEWCEOq -0.412 -0.304 -0.023 -0.435 
 (0.292) (0.286) (0.186) (0.323) 
MVq-1 0.211*** 0.241*** -0.210*** 0.001 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.033) (0.057) 
Qq-1  0.050* 0.041 0.053*** 0.103*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.017) (0.029) 
ROAq-1 1.705*** 1.734*** -0.978*** 0.727 
 (0.492) (0.481) (0.313) (0.544) 
IOq-1 0.478*** 0.411*** 0.362*** 0.840*** 
 (0.154) (0.151) (0.098) (0.170) 
ANALYSTq -0.008 -0.004 0.056*** 0.049*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) 
ANDISPq -0.016 -0.019 0.072*** 0.057** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.015) (0.026) 
HORIZONq -0.002* -0.001 -0.003*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Intercept 4.273 3.591 5.441*** 9.714*** 
 (2.630) (2.575) (1.675) (2.912) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,451 14,451 14,451 14,451 
Adjusted R2  0.526 0.526 0.339 0.601 
OLS regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and the frequency of earnings 
guidance. VESTING, UNVESTED, VESTED, SALARY, and BONUS are in ten millions. CEOAGE and 
CEOTENURE are in hundreds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 
1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
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Table 11: Equity sales following positive earnings guidance events 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Window [0, +2] [0, +5] [0, +10] [0, + 15] [0, +20] 
(a) EQUITYSOLD%  11.5% 24.7% 39.6% 55.6% 67.0% 
(b) Benchmark EQUITYSOLD% 6.2% 12.3% 22.6% 32.9% 43.2% 
t-stat of testing (a) = (b) 9.48*** 15.83*** 17.85*** 20.41*** 19.95*** 
This table reports (a) EQUITYSOLD%, the average percentage of equity sold in vesting quarters over window 
[0, x], with day 0 being the announcement date of a positive earnings guidance event in I/B/E/S and x being 
the 2nd, 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th trading day after the event, and how it compares to (b) a benchmark percentage 
calculated using the total number of trading days in a quarter and a random distribution of equity sales. The 
last row reports the t-statistics of testing whether EQUITYSOLD% equals the corresponding benchmark. We 
limit the sample to vesting quarters with at least one positive earnings guidance event and with equity sales. *** 
(**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
Table 12: Vesting equity and likelihood of beating analyst consensus forecasts 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables 
BEATq 
BEAT_ 
BELOW1q 
BEAT_ 
ABOVE1q 
VESTINGq 15.474*** 8.119* 7.225 
 (4.326) (4.496) (4.459) 
 [5.642***] [1.471*] [2.862] 
UNVESTEDq-1 3.013 2.313 1.356 
 (2.027) (1.421) (0.833) 
VESTEDq-1 -0.035 0.001 -0.029 
 (0.086) (0.075) (0.052) 
SALARYq-1 0.035 0.058 0.015 
 (0.071) (0.061) (0.043) 
BONUSq-1  0.009 -0.030 0.024 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) 
CEOAGEq-1 -0.424* -0.243 -0.276* 
 (0.230) (0.207) (0.150) 
CEOTENUREq-1 -0.023 -0.021 -0.005 
 (0.268) (0.231) (0.124) 
NEWCEOq  0.019 -0.262 0.123 
 (0.174) (0.234) (0.171) 
MVq-1 0.074*** -0.024 0.072*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Qq-1  -0.022* 0.062*** -0.056*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) 
ROAq-1 1.852*** 1.435*** 1.099*** 
 (0.275) (0.318) (0.201) 
IOq-1 0.080 -0.024 0.085* 
 (0.055) (0.053) (0.044) 
ANALYSTq 0.001 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
ANDISPq -0.124*** -0.097*** -0.092*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) 
HORIZONq -0.001** 0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.027 -1.133*** -0.252* 
 (0.178) (0.165) (0.143) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,764 16,764 16,764 
Adjusted R2  0.040 0.040 0.040 
Probit regression results on the relationship between the CEO’s vesting equity and the likelihood of beating 
the quarterly analyst consensus forecast. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. VESTING, UNVESTED, and 
VESTED are in billions. SALARY and BONUS are in millions. CEOAGE and CEOTENURE are in hundreds. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. For VESTING, the marginal effects are displayed below the standard 
errors. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
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